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If we turn to the past, say to the height of the streetcar era in the
1920s, we see that transit played an enormous role in the life of American cities. Not
even the most ardent transit opponent questions that historical fact. But even then,
transit was not used for all types of trips.
Before the automobile age, the great competitor of transit was walking.
This goes back to the very beginnings of public transit:
When most people lived within a few miles of their jobs, shopping, and
recreational sites during the horsecar days, a considerable diversion from transit riding
could be found in walking trips, fluctuating, of course, according to weather and season.30
In the 1920s, walking was the primary mode for a very important type of
trip: shopping. In most residential areas, almost every street had a small store, usually
part of someones house, that sold basic items such as bread, milk and tobacco. Also
in walking distance, usually on a major commercial street, were meat markets, bakeries,
drug stores, hardware stores, shops that met peoples everyday needs. Only major
shopping trips, such as "going downtown" to a department store for clothing or
furniture, were made by transit.
In addition, a great number of what are "trips" today were
then needs met by home delivery. Instead of going to the grocery store, people phoned in
an order and the groceries were delivered to their house, often by a boy on a bicycle.
Most homes had the services of a milkman, bread man, ice man and "egg lady."
Farmers came around in wagons or trucks in the summer, selling vegetables and fruits
door-to-door. There were tens of thousands of "drummers" on the roads, selling
brushes remember the Fuller Brush Man? vacuum cleaners, and a wide variety
of other household goods house-to-house. And, of course, when you got sick, the doctor
came to you, you didnt go to the doctor.
The point is that these types of trips, especially most shopping trips,
were never transit competitive, not even in transits heyday. Yet today, they
make up the single largest category of trips. A 1983 study found that 35.6% of total trips
nationally were for shopping, medical or dental visits or other errands. In comparison,
only 22.8% of total trips were work related, including commuting.31 A regional
study (of California) done in 1980 put home-based shopping trips alone at 26.1%, again the
largest source of home-based trips. 86.4% of those trips were done by automobile.
Interestingly, the past still showed its hand: the next most common mode for home-based
shopping trips was walking, at 8.3%. This study gave transit 3.7% of shopping trips.32
Other studies generally agree: the 1983 report cited previously gave transit a 1.1% share
of "Family and personal business," down slightly from 1.6% in 1977 (in 1983,
87.9% of such trips were by car).33
Two Chicago studies make it clear that when the trip purpose is
shopping, not even rail transit makes a difference which again is historically
consistent, because in the 1920s, our baseline, most public transit was by rail, on
streetcars. The first Chicago study, done in 1970, notes the rising importance of
shopping: "Among the nonwork trip purposes, shopping trips exhibited the greatest
change in relative importance between 1956 and 1970. In 1970, trips with purpose to shop
constituted 12.6 percent of all trips, while in 1956 they amounted to only 5.5 percent of
the total
. Accordingly, more shopping trips are being made, and many of the shopping
trips that were formerly accomplished by walking (which would not be included in the
survey) are being made by auto."34 The latter point is doubly significant:
the shift of shopping trips from walking to automobile was still underway in the 1950s and
1960s, and surveys tended not to count such trips when made on foot, thereby ignoring a
large and important share of trips now made by car that were not taken from public
transit.
Of the shopping trips made in 1970 in Chicago, 96.1% were made by car,
in a city with extensive rail transit. In fact, only .3% were made by commuter (suburban)
rail and .8% by rapid transit. Bus actually did better, at 2.6%.35 The second
study, with data from 1994, confirms the general picture. Looking specifically at
CTAs Orange Line, it found that only 2.2% of trips were for shopping.36
The point is conclusive: shopping and many other types of personal
trips are not transit competitive trips today, because they never were. Their
nature as non-transit competitive trips goes far, given their high share of total trips,
to explain the magic 1% (or 2% or 5%) of total trips made on transit. Further, if transit
is today a "failure" for not carrying more trips of this nature, then it was
just as much a failure at its peak in the 1920s when everyone agrees it was a
success!
What, then, are transit competitive trip purposes? The most important
is trips to and from work, commuting trips. This, too, has a long history, reaching all
the way back to transits glory days. A study of transit in Boston in 1930 states:
During this time (1917-1927), the annual number of revenue passengers
remained more or less fixed
but the change in character of riding is significant. The
number of Sunday and holiday passengers declined about 20 percent. This is to be accounted
for by two things the automobile and the increasing prevalence of summer
vacation
. Since 1917
there has been an accentuation of the peak hour of the
day. This is but another example that the railway service is becoming more and more a
business service.37
The trend toward commuting as transits main function has
strengthened with time and is evident in any transit operation in the nation, sufficiently
so that one example is enough. The 1994 study of ridership on Chicagos Orange Line
found that 60.6% of the riders were riding to or from work. The next largest category,
school trips, was a distant 13.6%.38
In fact, the question should be put the other way: is commuting the
only type of trip that we may classify as transit competitive? Our answer is no, and again
it comes from history. When electric railways streetcars, interurbans, and that
favorite New England hybrid, the country trolley first came on the scene in the
1890s, one trip purpose they competed for with gusto and success was entertainment trips.
Many an amusement park began as an enterprise of the local trolley or interurban line,
which rang up fares by the thousand as it hauled people from the sweltering city to its
roller coasters, ponds and picnic groves. "Trippers" brought their own picnics
and simply got off the car at a country stop, found a pleasant meadow to lunch in and, not
infrequently, walked part of the way back along the line for a constitutional. Streetcars
hauled vast throngs to ball games and other public entertainments: the local baseball team
was not the "Brooklyn Trolley Dodgers" for nothing. In fact, just taking an
open-air car out into the country on a warm summer evening was entertainment, and many
people rode for the sheer joy of it. Some companies had "party trolleys" with
Victrolas, and early in the century, an enterprising pair of newlyweds made their
honeymoon journey from Delaware to Maine entirely by trolley car. They even wrote a book
about it!
Is it fair to argue that todays transit should be able to compete
in the entertainment market? Most transit professionals would probably argue not. But we
disagree. The same standard that leads us to argue against expecting transit to carry many
shoppers history argues for measuring its ability in the recreation market.
And there is evidence that it can again compete here, from the fast-growing popularity of
"heritage" trolley lines, which people ride both for transportation and for fun,
to the throngs carried to and from the Atlanta Olympics on MARTA, 25.3 million people in
17 days.39 In Washington, D.C., 70% of all trips to the new MCI sports center
are on transit.
Thus we have our definition of transit competitive trips: availability
of transit X quality of transit X trip purpose (commuting to work or entertainment). Does
transit work? The answer depends on how many transit competitive trips it carries. To see
what that answer is, lets turn to three case studies.
Case Studies
Our three case studies are Chicagos Metra commuter rail system
and the Light Rail systems in San Diego and St. Louis. We chose them because, first, each
represents high quality transit. They are not merely rail systems, but well run rail
systems. Each should be able to compete effectively for transit competitive trips.
Second, these systems represent the future. Virtually all new rail
transit systems in America will be either commuter rail or Light Rail. At costs sometimes
exceeding $100 million per mile, Heavy Rail "metros" have essentially priced
themselves out of the game. The most recent attempt to build a Heavy Rail system from
scratch, Los Angeless Red Line, quickly degenerated into a technical, financial and
political fiasco. While analysis in terms of transit competitive trips can certainly be
applied to Heavy Rail systems, doing so would be little more than an academic exercise,
because no more are likely to be built.40
Finally, we chose these three systems because they give us different
perspectives in time. Metra, which was established as a successor to private railroad
commuter service in 1983, is a relatively new commuter rail system, but not so new that
its performance is mostly speculation. San Diego offers the oldest "new" Light
Rail system, that is, Light Rail in its "second coming" after the decline and
near-disappearance of the streetcar. And St. Louis offers the "latest thing" in
Light Rail, a system very similar to what any city now considering Light Rail would get
(or at least should get). Its one line represents a classic "starter line," and
it was built for the eminently reasonable price of $20 million per mile. St. Louis has
also pioneered the use of volunteer labor on a modern Light Rail line (as distinguished
from Heritage Trolleys), which we believe is a highly important precedent.
Before we look at the first of our cases, we need to add a word about
method of analysis. Our goal is to determine how effectively these three high quality
systems compete for transit competitive trips, i.e., what percentage of such trips they
carry. In a world of ideal statistics, that would be relatively easy. First, we would
determine the size of the population served by these three rail systems, based on the
"catchment area:" the number of people who can walk to a train station or
trolley stop, plus the number who can drive and find parking, plus the number of bus seats
serving the train stops (minus some number reflecting reluctance to take a bus, even to a
train). Then, other statistics would tell us how many commuter or entertainment trips that
population generates. We would count the riders on the trains or Light Rail cars, compare
that number with the total, and have the percentage of transit competitive trips carried
by transit.
Unfortunately, in the real world, its not that simple. Not
surprisingly, since we are introducing a new measuring standard in "transit
competitive trips," we find the statistics have not been compiled that way. No one
has attempted to count transit competitive trips. We hope someone will do so. Many a
useful and publishable paper is to be found in doing so. But so far, as best as we can
determine, it hasnt been done.
That leaves us rummaging about in the data as we find it. It is not a
satisfactory situation, but it is not a hopeless one either. There are indicators, enough
that it is possible to put together a useful picture. Lets take a look at our three
cases and see what we find.
Metra
Metra is the nations second largest commuter rail system, with
twelve lines, 546 route miles, 1.6 billion passenger miles in 1996 and 240 stations
serving more that 100 communities.41 By commuter rail standards, Metra easily
meets the availability test for transit competitive trips (Heavy Rail, Light Rail and bus
systems generally have better availability than commuter rail, because they are more
concentrated in the citys dense core area). As already noted, Metra also meets the
quality test: its 97% on-time performance is the best in the country.42
So how does it do? In short, vastly better than the 1% or 2% or 5%
figures usually cited. Chicagos Central Business District (CBD) remains the economic
heart of the region. "More jobs are concentrated in downtown Chicago than anywhere in
the region, and more than half a million people commute to those jobs every day.
More than 1.1 million trips are made each day to Chicagos central area
. Between
50 and 60 percent of trips made to the CBD are on transit (emphasis added)."43
Further, "Commuter rail has become the most prevalent form of transit for CBD work
trips, followed by bus and rapid transit."44 Specifically, Metra carried
21% of CBD commuting trips in 1990.45
A look at transit trends in Chicago makes the success of Metra and the
high quality service it represents even more clear. Between 1980 and 1990,
"transits CBD market share for work trips dropped from 67% to 55%."46
The principal drop was in bus riders; rapid transit fell slightly; and
Metra ridership grew by about 15% between 1985 and 1995.
Generally, all Metra zones have been experiencing steady growth since 1985.
Ridership in zones A and B (combined) increased by about 800,000 annual riders between
1990 and 1994. These are the zones closest to the CBD. This 14 percent increase may be due
to switching of CTA (Heavy Rail) passengers to Metra to benefit from better fares and a
better passenger environment.47
In other words, people were showing preference for one rail system over
another, in part on the basis of quality. And Metras success continues to build: the
most recent ridership statistics show Metra ridership up from 73.4 million in 1996 to 75.2
million in 1997.48
The importance of transit to Chicago is further illustrated by
considering what would happen if the 50 to 60% of trips to the CBD made on transit shifted
to automobiles.
The Chicago area has the fifth worst traffic congestion in the United
States, and congestion is increasing annually. Traffic reduces worker productivity and
increases likelihood of accidents. A typical driver in Chicago spends 34 hours per year
sitting in traffic. Delays caused by congestion are costly for businesses, particularly
those dependent on frequent and timely deliveries and "just in time" inventory.
The annual cost of Chicago area congestion has been estimated at $2.8 billion.
The Chicago region could not afford to build its way out of traffic
congestion. There is not sufficient funding in Illinois to maintain the existing highway
system. Building of new roads is becoming extremely difficult in the face of cost,
environmental restrictions, and public opposition. In much of the Chicago area, roadway
capacity could not be expanded without demolishing homes and businesses.49
One statistic brings transits role home to anyone who knows the
city of Chicago. "The Dan Ryan/Kennedy Expressways carry 200,000 vehicles per day,
while parallel CTA/Metra (rail) lines carry 182,000 riders."50 If all
182,000 rail riders drove instead, those Expressways would simply stop, gridlocked.
Metras phenomenal success, as the largest and still-rising mode
in a transit service that carries 50-60% of all CBD trips, suggests a question: just who
is riding those trains? The answer helps dispel some of the false images of transit we
criticized in our earlier study. Metras riders are overwhelmingly white (86%), well
educated (66.7% college graduates), professional/technical (47.9%) or managerial/business
owner (27%), and very, very well off. In 1995, 24.9% of Metras riders had household
incomes of $100,000 or more. Only 5.6% had incomes under $25,000. And -- perhaps the
definitive indicator of Metras ability to compete for transit competitive trips --
85.6% of Metras riders had an automobile available for the trip, if they wanted to
drive.51
Consistent with our definition of transit competitive trips, in 1996
92.7% of Metras riders were on work or business related trips. What about
entertainment/ recreational travel? On the surface, the numbers are not encouraging. In
1996, only 2.7% of Metra trips fell into this category, down from 4.4% in 1991 and up just
slightly from 2% in 1985.
However, 20% of one-way ticket users were on a social or recreational
trip, and 43% of all Metra riders indicated they had used Metra for recreation at least
once in the previous six months.52 Metra itself sees a major future for this
market. Its Marketing Plan for 1997 states, "The recreational market serves as the
main focus of our secondary market."53 "Recreational travel
promotions include discount coupons and weekend Family Fares extended to include weekdays
during the summer. Popular suburban attractions include the Ravinia Festival, Arlington
International Racecourse, and riverboat casinos."54 It will be interesting
to follow Metras progress in gaining recreational riders.
Metra is a testimonial to what high quality transit can do in terms of
competing for transit competitive trips. To its credit, it is not resting on its laurels.
In 1991, Metra adopted a program called "Future Agenda for Suburban
Transportation," or FAST. FAST will add service to 50 more municipalities and 100
stations, plus 280 route miles, expanding transit availability the sine qua non
of competitive success. It will also add up to 36,000 new parking spaces, beyond the
18,000 added since 1988. Parking is a major component of transit availability. And FAST
will add a whole new dimension of quality service: speed. In addition to its 97% on time
service, Metra will attempt to cover 50 miles in 45 minutes. In rush periods, that will
make Metra faster than driving. Metra understands that for its upscale clientele, time is
money.55
Speaking of money, how much does Metra cost? Metra recovered 58% of its
operating expenses from the farebox in 1997 the highest percentage in the country
for a commuter rail service plus 5% of passenger revenues for capital financing.
And it did so with fares that were less than 5% above 1983 rates.56
In sum, from every perspective, Metra does it right and it
works!
San Diego
While the San Diego Trolley and Chicagos Metra commuter rail
system both run on rails, the similarity largely ends there. The two cities are very
different. San Diegos CBD is much less important to the region than Chicagos.
While Chicagos commuting market includes a large proportion of wealthy executives
and managers, San Diegos is tilted toward immigrant laborers. San Diego is also very
much part of Californias well-known "car culture." To a visitor from an
eastern city like Chicago, San Diego appears to be an endless string of suburbs, connected
by roads.
The two rail systems are as different as the two cities. Metra is a
long-distance, high speed commuter rail line. San Diegos Trolley is just that: a
streetcar system, though one with a great deal of private right-of-way. Stops are
frequent, runs are comparatively short and speeds are much lower: while Metra can talk of
"50 miles in 45 minutes," the average speed of the San Diego Trolley is 21.9
miles per hour. San Diego recently began service on its own commuter rail system, the
Coaster, but this study will focus on the Trolley.
The San Diego Trolley has much to tell other cities which are
considering Light Rail. The San Diego Trolley is the first Light Rail system built in the
United States since World War II. Its initial line, running from downtown south to the
Mexican border opposite Tijuana, opened on July 26, 1981. The system has steadily expanded
since, but its history now reaches back almost 20 years. That is enough time to look at
initial promises with some perspective and see whether they have been borne out.
But first, we need to see how the Trolley meets our basic criteria:
availability and quality of service. Availability presents a mixed picture. In downtown
San Diego, it is excellent. Not only is the Trolley in easy walking distance of the main
business district, it also directly serves the downtown entertainment and convention
centers, the waterfront and the Santa Fe railroad station, which is the end of the line
for the Coaster commuter train (in fact, the Trolley has two direct interchange stations
with the Coaster). The only important downtown destination not served is the airport, a
line to which is planned.
The Trolleys availability outside the downtown is mixed. The
Orange (east) Line serves many suburbs, the Blue (south) Line fewer. The most recent line
extension intersects the critical I-15 corridor, but that corridor is merely intersected,
not served directly along its length. Nor does I-5 have a parallel Trolley line except for
a 3.5 mile segment from downtown San Diego to Old Town. On the whole, the Trolley serves
residents south and east of the city better than those to the north, where the more
affluent suburbs generally lie; this is evident in the demographics of the ridership.
In terms of quality, the Trolley rates high overall. The equipment is
simple but reliable and comfortable. Track quality is excellent. Stations are basic but
adequate, and the "honor fare" system is easy to use. However, two factors
detract from quality service. There is a perception of danger from crime. The actual crime
statistics are not bad, but the mix of races and social classes on board some lines causes
apprehension. This is a growing problem on transit nationally, reflecting decreasing order
in the society as a whole; we will come back to this problem in the conclusion to our
study.57
The other detractor is the time between trolleys, which generally run
on a fifteen minute interval; the Blue Line has a 7.5 minute interval during rush hours
between Old Town and the Mexican border. In the palmy days of the streetcar, many a system
advertised, "Always a car in sight." New Orleanss St. Charles Avenue line,
the last survivor from those happy times, still follows that attractive practice. When a
rider has to wait up to a quarter of an hour before the wire sings and a car appears, he
starts thinking of getting around some other way. Originally, much of the San Diego system
was single track, which limited frequency. Now that it is all double track, frequency
should increase.
There is a third way in which the San Diego Trolley does not quite
measure up to Metra, though it is in no way San Diegos fault. The available
statistics do not allow us to measure its success in attracting transit competitive trips
quite so well. But we can find some useful indicators, and as with Metra, they point to
success far beyond one percent.
A first indicator is predictive success. If we look at the original
ridership predictions, then compare them with actual ridership, what do we find? Many
transit critics have said that original predictions have virtually always been high, as a
tactic to "sell" Light Rail. Then, the real numbers come in much lower.
According to a 1982 study, by 1995 the original Blue (south) Line of
the San Diego Trolley should have been carrying from 28,000 to 30,000 daily riders.58
In fact, by 1991 four years early it was carrying approximately 32,000
riders per day. Ridership was up to 34,000 per day by mid-1995 and to 51,135 per day in
May 1998 (including 5,080 on the Old Town segment and 5,350 per day on the Mission Valley
line). In 1991, ridership for the second line to open, the Orange (east) Line, also
"exceeded expectations; ridership on that line was 24,560 per day in May 1998."59
A 1992 study offers a number of other indicators as to the
Trolleys success in capturing transit competitive trips. "The Trolley has taken
single-occupant vehicles off the road, while increasing transit ridership in its
corridors."60 In 1985, 29.6% of Trolley passengers previously drove alone;
by 1990, that figure was up to 36.9%.61 "41 percent of trolley passengers
(36.1% in 1995) ride by choice, compared to only 26% (24.9% in 1995) for all transit
users
. the data seem to indicate that the boost in choice riders for the region
depends heavily on LRT (light rail) service."62 The study "indicates
that a higher proportion of trolley riders earn $30,000 or more than riders of the system
as a whole. Taken together, these data seems to indicate that the trolley attracts middle-
and upper-middle-income workers, even though they could drive to work."63
The 1992 study also has something to say about how the Trolley works in
cost terms. Over its first ten years, as ridership grew continuously, the real cost per
passenger dropped from $.91 to $.56, the cost per train mile fell from $6.82 to $5.60 and
the cost per car mile went down from $3.47 to $2.23 (all figures in 1982 dollars).64
And there is icing on that cake: "The closest the trolley came to breaking even
overall was in FY 89 when the recovery ratio reached 95.31 percent
. In FY 89, 90 and
91, the South Line actually ran a profit."65 In contrast, in FY 89 the San
Diego bus system recovered 42.9% of its costs from the farebox.
What has happened since 1991? A recent report by the San Diego
Metropolitan Transit Development Board shows an interesting picture. It compares the vital
statistics of transit in San Diego bus and trolley in 1976, 1986 and 1996.
The contrast between 1986 and 1996 is the most instructive, as Light Rail was in operation
in both years. Between 1986 and 1996, service miles grew from 13,687,286 to 21,216,572
(23,990,000 in 1998). That growth included almost a doubling of the Light Rail system.
This substantial addition of high quality rail transit worked its usual magic: ridership
grew from 35,192,140 to 62,168,114 (72,744,800 in 1998) - substantially more, as a
percentage, than the growth in service miles. The growth in total system ridership shows
that rail riders are not merely people who previously took the bus; in fact, in 1990, just
under 25% of Trolley riders formerly took the bus.66 Finally, with all this
growth, costs fell. Between 1986 and 1996, the farebox recovery ratio for the whole system
Light Rail and bus rose from 44.15% to 52.5% (51.9% in 1998), and the
subsidy per passenger declined from $.76 to $.69 ($.71 in 1998).67
How does the San Diego Trolley perform in competing for the two classes
of trips that transit should be able to compete effectively for, trips to work and
recreational trips? 44.8% of riders are using the Trolley to go to and from work. This
compares to 40.6% of riders of the system as a whole, indicating the Trolley competes for
commuters slightly better than the bus system.68 We must say we would expect
this difference to be higher.
The explanation is not inadequate parking. 47.9% of Trolley patrons
walk to the Trolley stop, which is consistent with our concept of availability. 13.9%
drive to the Trolley, compared with only 2.6% who drive to take a San Diego Transit bus.69
This is consistent with rail transits superior ability to draw riders from choice.
But in fact, not many people drive to the Trolley. With an average
weekday ridership of 75,692 (in May 1998), the San Diego Trolley offers only 5800 parking
spaces. And, on average, only 25% of these spaces are filled.
A possible explanation is reflected in another key measurement of the
San Diegos Trolleys ability to compete: the percentage of patrons who are
riders from choice. In 1995, only 36.1% of the Trolleys riders had a car available.70
That is less than half the figure for Chicagos Metra. We suggest the reason is the
demographics of the area served. As noted previously, the San Diego Trolley offers little
service to the wealthier suburbs, which generally lie north of the city. Those suburbs are
more likely to generate park-and-ride business, as Metra's experience demonstrates.
If we look at our final indicator and ask how San Diegos Light
Rail system does in competing for recreational trips, we find a surprise: it does
remarkably well. In 1995, almost 18% of all trips on the Trolley were for recreation or
entertainment.71 A more recent measurement comes from Super Bowl Week in 1998,
when nearly one million people used transit to get to and from Super Bowl events.
During the week leading up to the Super Bowl, San Diego Trolley
estimates well over 400,000 riders used the trolley to go to Super Fest, the Players
Party behind the convention center, and the NFL Experience in Mission Valley
.
Platforms at key stations were filled with waiting riders, some eight to nine deep. San
Diego Trolley put extra trains into service, with frequencies approaching every three
minutes, and demand was so high, San Diego Trolley provided non-stop service
round-the-clock both Friday and Saturday nights into Sunday morning
. On Super Bowl
Sunday
Estimates are that San Diego Trolley carried more than 30,000 fans (twice what
had been predicted) to the stadium by the 3:18 kickoff
. As the game went into its
final 28 seconds, with spectators still in their seats, San Diego Trolley had 21 train
sets standing by in pocket tracks and nearby locations. Within 30 minutes after the gamed
ended, the system had sent 14 trains out of Qualcomm Stadium, packed with departing fans.72
Shades of 1910! This picture virtually duplicates the scene at any ball
game, amusement park or church revival meeting at the height of the streetcar era. The
fact that it can be duplicated in 1998 is clear evidence that rail transit can compete for
entertainment trips. It is doing so not only in San Diego, but in Cleveland, in Atlanta
where MARTAs rail system was the transportation backbone of the Olympics
and wherever else rail serves major recreational and entertainment locations.
In sum, while the data is less solid for the San Diego Trolley than for
Metra, it is clear that in San Diego Light Rail is competing for transit competitive trips
more effectively than are buses. More than a third of the Trolleys riders have a car
available but choose to take the Trolley instead. As Trolley service is expanded in the
northern suburbs, that figure should rise. And the Trolleys recent gains in
ridership in 1997, it carried 19.5 million people, the highest number in its
history show that it is competing ever more effectively within those portions of
the metropolitan area that it serves today.
Go to part 3
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