Transit Cooperative Research Program
Sponsored by the Federal Transit Administration
Research Results Digest
April 1999 Number 33
Subject Areas: IA Planning and Administration, Responsible Senior Program Officer:
Christopher W. Jenks
VI Public Transit, VII Rail
International Transit Studies Program
Report on the Spring 1998 Mission, Part 1
Private Urban Transit Systems and Low-Cost Mobility
Solutions in Major Latin American Cities
This TCRP digest summarizes the eighth mission performed under TCRP
Project J-3, "International Transit Studies Program." The report includes
information on the cities and facilities visited, lessons learned, and discussions of
policies and practices
that could be applied in the United States. This digest was prepared by
Tracy E. Dunleavy of the Eno Transportation Foundation, Inc., the contractor for the
project, on the basis of reports filed by the mission participants.
For information on prior ITSP missions, consult TCRP Research Results
Digests 20, 22, 27, and 31.
INTERNATIONAL TRANSIT STUDIES PROGRAM
About the Program
The International Transit Studies Program (ITSP) is part of the Transit
Cooperative Research Program (TCRP). ITSP is managed by the Eno Transportation Foundation
under contract to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). TCRP was authorized by the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) and reauthorized in 1998
by the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21). It is governed by a
three-way memorandum of agreement signed by the NAS, acting through its Transportation
Research Board (TRB); the Transit Development Corporation, which is the education and
research arm of the American Public Transit Association (APTA); and the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA). TCRP is funded annually by a grant from the FTA.
ITSP is designed to assist in the professional development of transit
managers, public officials, planners, and others charged with public transportation
responsibilities in the United States. The program accomplishes this objective by
providing opportunities for participants to learn from foreign experience, while expanding
their network of domestic and international contacts for addressing public transport
problems and issues.
The program arranges study missions for teams of public transportation
professionals to visit exemplary transit operations in other countries. Each study mission
is arranged around a central theme that encompasses issues of concern in public
transportation. Cities and transit systems to be visited are selected on the basis of
their ability to demonstrate new ideas or unique approaches to handling public
transportation challenges reflected in the study mission's theme. Each study team is given
a briefing before departing on an intensive 2-week mission. After this stimulating
professional interaction, study team members return home with ideas for possible
application in their own communities. Team members are encouraged to share their
international experience and findings with peers in the public transportation community
throughout the United States. Study mission experience also helps to better evaluate
current and proposed transit improvements and can serve to identify potential public
transportation research topics.
Study missions normally are conducted in the spring and fall of each
year. Study teams consist of up to 15 individuals, including a senior official designated
as the group's spokesperson. Transit agencies are contacted directly and asked to nominate
candidates for participation. Nominees are screened by a committee of transit officials,
and the TCRP Project J-3 Oversight Panel approves the selection.
Study mission participants are transit management personnel with
substantial knowledge and experience in transit activities. Participants must demonstrate
potential for advancement to higher levels of public transportation responsibilities.
Other selection criteria include current responsibilities, career objectives, and the
probable professional development value of the mission for the participant and sponsoring
employer. Travel expenses for participants are paid through TCRP Project J-3 funding.
For further information about the study missions or individual travel
awards, contact the TCRP (202/334-3089) or the Eno Transportation Foundation
(202/879-4712).
CONTENTS
International Transit Studies Program, 1
About the Program, 1
About the Report, 3
Private Urban Transit Systems and Low-Cost Mobility Solutions in Major
Latin American Cities:
Mission 8, April 18-May 2, 1998, 3
Introduction, 3
Transit Profiles, 3
Buenos Aires, Argentina, 3
Montevideo, Uruguay, 5
Porto Alegre, Brazil, 5
Curitiba, Brazil, 6
São Paulo, Brazil, 7
Lessons Learned, 8
Factors for Success, 8
Privatization of Metro and Commuter Rail, 12
Models of Government Regulation, 16
Busway Planning, Design, and Operation, 18
High Fare Recovery Ratio, 21
Government Enforcement of Bus Maintenance, 23
Customer Service and Users’ Opinions, 24
Summary of Policies and Practices Applicable to the United States, 34
Privatization, 34
Busways, 35
Integrated Approach, 35
Median Busways, 35
Feeder-Trunk System, 35
Land-Use Coordination, 35
APPENDIX A: Mission Participants and Their Titles and Affiliations at
the Time of the Mission, 37
APPENDIX B: Urban Planning in Curitiba, Brazil, 38
Humane City and Design with Nature Concepts, 38
Comprehensiveness and Interrelatedness, 38
Plan Implementation Strategies, 39
Summary, 40
About the Report
The following report is an overview of the eighth study mission. It
reflects the views of the contributing participants, who are responsible for the facts and
accuracy of the data presented. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of the
TCRP, TRB, NAS, APTA, FTA, or the Eno Transportation Foundation.
PRIVATE URBAN TRANSIT SYSTEMS
AND LOW-COST MOBILITY SOLUTIONS
IN MAJOR LATIN AMERICAN CITIES: MISSION 8, APRIL 18–MAY 2, 1998
Introduction
The 2-week mission involved visits and discussions with transportation
providers in Buenos Aires, Argentina; Montevideo, Uruguay; and Porto Alegre, Curitiba, and
São Paulo, Brazil.
This mission explored:
· Private-sector financing and operation of transportation systems in
Buenos Aires;
· Intermodal ground and waterborne transit in the Buenos Aires and
Montevideo regions;
· Bus platooning, exclusive busways and a low-cost and low-tech
transit system in Porto Alegre;
· Bus system and busway development that achieves ridership levels in
Curitiba comparable to some heavy-rail systems;
· Privately operated, government-supervised bus fleets along with
exclusive bus corridors in São Paulo;
· Pollution monitoring techniques and the tracking of the 16,000-bus
fleet in the São Paulo metro region;
· Use of performance measures and public surveys to monitor transit
system performance in São Paulo;
· Route restructuring to improve service to outlying terminals in
Montevideo; and
· Integration of community services in transit terminals in Curitiba.
This report has two main sections. The first section presents an
overview of the transit operations in each city visited, including information on public
and private suppliers of transportation services. The second section focuses on the main
transit strategies and technologies observed by the mission participants. The report
concludes with a summary of policies and practices that could be applied in the United
States.
Appendix A lists the names of the study mission participants and their
titles and affiliations at the time of the mission. The study team learned much about
specific urban planning theories and concepts, which are discussed in Appendix B.
TRANSIT PROFILES
This section discusses the transit services offered in the cities
visited by the study mission team. It also examines services provided by some public- and
private-sector transportation operators.
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Buenos Aires has developed one of the world's better urban
transportation systems. The system evolved fortuitously around the unique, privately
operated colectivo—small operators banded together into route associations.
Travelers are seldom more than one block from a bus, and often they have a choice of buses
to take.
The subway system, on the other hand, was designed for the Buenos Aires
of an earlier era (the first line was constructed in 1915). The system has had diminishing
adequacy in the modern city, given the two socially distinct, yet similar, patterns of
commuting. Most professionals, businesspeople, and other white-collar workers commute
downtown by car or train from the northern zones. Blue-collar workers generally commute
across town, from residential to industrial sections, by colectivo.
Most city traffic is regulated by automatic traffic lights, but the
city's residents are notorious for ignoring them. For many years, two major streets, Calle
Florida and Calle Lavalle, were closed to motor traffic during part of the day to allow
for a free flow of pedestrians. Today, Calle Florida, is reserved for pedestrians only.
The highway system in Buenos Aires includes several expressways that
radiate out from the central core to connect with Avenida General Paz, which circles most
of the city, forming a spokelike pattern. Other main avenues connect the Plaza de Mayo, in
the heart of the city, with outlying neighborhoods. Buenos Aires is the terminus of every
major railway in the country. There are also electric suburban lines linking the city with
the towns of Tigre and Moreno.
The international airport of Ezeiza, Don Torcuato airport, and El
Palomar, the military airport, are respectively located outside city limits in the
partidos of Esteban Echeverria, Tigre, and Morón. They are connected to the city by
expressways. Jorge Newberry, the Buenos Aires City Airport, lies within the federal
district and serves domestic airlines, as well as those that operate to and from
neighboring countries.
During the second half of this century, tramways and trains were
replaced by automobiles and colectivos as the dominant modes of transportation in the
city. Unlike many other large Western cities, Buenos Aires is not yet ringed by a network
of superhighways. A complete network was planned after World War II, but economic and
political difficulties prevented its construction. By the late 20th century, the existing
network of streets was severely congested with vehicular traffic, and the need to improve
other modes of transportation seemed imperative as traffic jams and gridlock added to the
more frustrating characteristics of contemporary Buenos Aires. Some progress was made in
1979 when the Metropolitan Railroad was established to cope with the capital's traffic
problems. City and suburban authorities were coordinated, and in succeeding years, plans
to expand and electrify the rail lines were executed. Newer Japanese-built railroad cars
have replaced older cars on some lines.
National Transport Regulation Commission (CNRT). Created less
than a year before this mission, CNRT is the national government’s oversight
commission for surface transportation (including urban and interurban bus, rail, and
commuter services). CNRT has taken over the functions previously exercised by three
separate government commissions dealing with buses, rail, and rail privatization. Its
primary regulatory function is enforcing a 10-year vehicle age limit. This is considered
an environmental and quality-of-service regulation.
This commission, operating under the authority of the Ministry of
Economics and Public Works, seeks to ensure a level playing field among private operators
by promoting competition and protecting the rights of passengers. It monitors the
performance of private contractors, ensures quality control of services, levels penalties
on operators for noncompliance with the provisions of their contracts, and approves fares.
CNRT is not responsible for oversight of the recently privatized rail services.
Cometrans Consortium (Metropolitan Transportation Consortium). This
private company, owned by 18 local medium- and long-distance bus companies, is one of the
largest bus operators. It maintains a fleet of more than 2,100 buses and travels over
1,442 route miles. Cometrans, together with a Brazilian company, has just won a 20-year
concession to operate the Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) metro system.
Cometrans is part of an international consortium that includes two U.S.
rail companies—Burlington Northern Railway Company (BN) of Fort Worth Texas, and
Morrison Knudsen Rail Systems (MK), a subsidiary of the M.K. Corporation. This consortium
has been awarded the operation of the subway, commuter rail, and light-rail lines in the
capital region. Its objective is to improve the efficiency, productivity, and revenues of
the public transport services. Cometrans competes with Metropolitano and Metrovias
Consortia, which operate other commuter rail and subway lines.
Bus Services
Bus services are provided by route associations of independent
operators (empresas or private bus companies) who own the colectivo mini- and
midibuses that collectively account for 80 percent of all public transport. In 1997, these
associations provided more than 7 million daily trips and carried an estimated 2.8 billion
passengers. The current trend is toward consolidation with about 100 operators reported
last year, down from about 130 in the early 1990s.
About 33 percent of the participants in the route associations are
owner-drivers who operate a single vehicle, but most of the associations own fleets of
varying sizes. The total number of privately operated buses providing service in the
Buenos Aires metropolitan area is more than 11,000. In 1995, about 33 percent of the fleet
(3,800 vehicles) was reported to be more than 10 years old and scheduled for mandatory
replacement, but funding problems have delayed vehicle replacement. Higher quality express
services with seats for all passengers are offered at higher fares on some routes.
The only public subsidy provided to bus operators is a fuel subsidy.
Increasing competition from taxis and illegally operated old coaches and paratransit
vehicles has cut into the ridership of scheduled services. Patronage has also been lost to
the commuter trains whose services have much improved following privatization initiatives.
Bus operators are under considerable financial pressure and have petitioned the oversight
body for substantial fare increases.
Transportes Plaza. Also owned by Cometrans, Transportes Plaza
is one of the largest of the empresas companies. It operates a fleet of 411 buses and runs
6 bus lines in the capital. The company reports an annual passenger load of 79 million and
annual revenues in the range of $40 million. Transportes Plaza is staffed by more than
1,200 people. Like all of the 100-plus empresas, it operates without a government subsidy.
Urban and Regional Rail Privatization
In the early 1990s, a national policy was introduced that mandated the
privatization of state-owned enterprises. In carrying out this policy, three concessions
to operate the metropolitan-area rail networks have been awarded by the government over
the past few years. The privatized metro, light rail, and commuter rail operations
together carry 1.5 million passengers daily in the greater Buenos Aires area. There are
about 500 miles of rail lines and 4,200 daily trains in the capital region. Cometrans is
responsible for the combined operations.
Trenes de Buenos Aires (TBA). TBA, like the other major
operators, is a joint venture comprising Cometrans, MK, and BN. Cometrans and MK each own
41.65 percent of the company’s stock, and BN owns 16.7 percent.
TBA operates the Mitre and the Sarmiento urban rail lines to the
northern and western suburbs of the greater Buenos Aires metropolitan region. The Mitre
line is 115 miles in length with 55 stations; the Sarmiento line operates 120 miles with
44 stations. Respectively, these lines have carried 50 million and 90 million passengers
annually in recent years. The 235-mile system, 25 percent of which is electrified,
encompasses 97 stations. Since May 1995, TBA has made investments to upgrade rolling
stock, renew infrastructure, and improve on-time performance (which has now reached 99
percent). Train and station security, as well as fare enforcement, have also improved
significantly.
Metrovias. This private consortium is made up of the majority
partner, (Argentinean) Benito Roggio e Hijos, S.A. (55.3 percent) and minority partners,
Cometrans (28 percent) and BN (16.7 percent). Like other metropolitan-area rail networks,
Metrovias receives government subsidies to operate its four-line subway system and its
urban rail line. In total, Metrovias’s network reports more than 500 million annual
boardings.
Since the Metrovias consortium took over the renewable 20-year
concession in January 1994, ridership has increased substantially, staff has been reduced
to about 3,000, tracks have been renewed, communication systems have been upgraded, and
100 reconditioned railcars have been acquired from the Tokyo subway system.
Metropolitano. Metropolitano is the operating company of three
commuter rail lines—Belgrano South, Roca, and San Martin. It has doubled ridership
since the private takeover of the run-down lines in 1994. The network, which totals 314
miles, is being refurbished and accounts for an annual ridership in excess of 220 million.
Montevideo, Uruguay
Bus Services
Urban bus services in Montevideo are provided by a number of private
cooperatives and companies, the largest of which is Compania Uruguaya de Transportes
Colectivos SA (CUTCSA). Four smaller bus-operating groups (COETC, COME, RAINCOOP, and
UCOT) provide service in the capital. COETC operates seven routes with 167 buses; COME,
eight routes with 111 buses; RAINCOOP, seven routes with 119 buses; and UCOT, seven routes
with 119 buses. The urban bus fleet in Montevideo totals 1,500 vehicles and carries 300
million passengers annually.
CUTCSA. The largest single private urban bus operator in South
America, CUTSCA, operates 105 routes with a fleet of 1,025 buses of diverse origin
(Leyland, Scania, Volvo, and Mercedes models). CUTCSA carries over 210 million passengers
and covers more than 50 million vehicle miles a year.
CUTSCA has a staff of 6,000 employees. In 1996, the company launched a
"zero accident" initiative and managed to reverse a 5-year trend by reducing
incidents 17 percent in a single year. Drivers are given a bonus for accident-free
performance. The vast majority of the CUTSCA fleet—more than 900 vehicles—is
still operating with conductors. The company has embarked on a plan to convert to a
one-person operation with magnetic fare cards. Bus service in Montevideo is managed by the
city through the Ministry of Transport. Subsidies called "social fares" are paid
to operators to carry students and riders with disabilities at lower fares.
Rail
The Uruguayan State Railways (AFE) contracts out a commuter rail
service on a 40-mile line between Montevideo and a city named 25 de Augusto to private
operator Rutalmar SA. The municipality is currently studying a seven-route light-rail
network which would link the city center with the inner suburbs and run along segregated
rights-of-way to reduce congestion on major roads. The first link is planned to open in
2000.
Porto Alegre, Brazil
Buses and Busways
Twenty-six private operators provide bus and minibus services under the
supervision of the city, which has established Comonor, a busway "platooning"
system to speed bus traffic and lower congestion. The bus fleet totals 1,600, most of
which are standard-size Mercedes models. About 150 minibuses are included in this number
and Volvo articulated buses have recently been introduced to further increase capacity.
The passenger count is 325 million annually. The bus operators also manage a fleet of 350
shared vans or taxis with 17 seats each that account for an additional 60 million
passengers a year. Farebox revenues fully cover operating costs; there are no operating
subsidies.
The exclusive bus lanes in the median of seven radial corridors that
converge on the city center are used by both urban and regional lines. During weekday rush
hours, bus flows on some of these corridors are in excess of 350 per hour, or about 6 per
minute. The platooning system maximizes the capacity of the bus lanes. Buses from and to
various destinations are held at lane entry points to travel in unison along the dedicated
lanes. These lanes are up to 3.1 miles in length, reaching passenger flows of 20,000 per
hour in each direction at an average speed of 12.4 mph. Passengers board at protected
stations along the way. An express bus service also operates along a dedicated lane with
local feeder bus connections.
Municipal Transport Secretariat (SMT). Porto Alegre’s
privately run network is supervised by the city’s SMT. The agency has developed a
strategy for evolving the transit service to meet the changing needs of the region’s
population. This strategy centers on a grid system with regularly spaced terminals for
easy passenger transfer.
Regional Metro
The Trensurb regional metro operates a single line, 16.76-mile system
with 25 Japanese (Nippon Sharyo/ Kawasaki) four-car trains. This heavily subsidized line
(69 percent), used by 30 million passengers each year, is currently being extended by two
stations (2.1 miles). This expansion is expected to yield an additional 40,000-plus
passengers per workday. Trensurb runs along a regional development corridor and is
operated and subsidized by the national government in line with its economic development
plans. Farebox revenues account for only 25 percent of operating costs.
Aeromovel
This 0.68-mile, low-cost people mover has been in operation for nearly
20 years, primarily as a demonstration project, with financial assistance from the
government. Powered by compressed air, Aeromovel has marketed its cost-effective concept
internationally with only limited success to date.
Curitiba, Brazil
Sixteen independent companies under contract to the city operate an
exemplary integrated local transit system. Unlike Buenos Aires and Montevideo where
various private operators compete for passengers and "own" the rights to various
routes, operators in Curitiba perform according to detailed service specifications issued
by URBS and are reimbursed on a per-kilometer basis.
Annual passenger ridership is 320 million on a total of 277 bus routes,
covering a network of 755 miles. Fares pay all of the system’s operating costs;
passengers over 65 and persons with disabilities ride free. A system of high-capacity
buses on limited-stop schedules provides an additional level of service and comfort within
the existing network.
Curitiba's "busway" system has won worldwide acclaim for
expanding a high-speed modern bus system into the capacity range of a metropolitan
railway. The transit environment in Curitiba is characterized by five express busways
flanked, one block away on either side, by high-capacity, one-way streets heading into and
out of the inner city. Land-use legislation over the past 25 years has encouraged
high-density, mixed-use development in areas adjacent to the busways. The system is
entirely integrated with interdistrict and feeder buses that make it easy to transfer from
express to local buses, and vice versa.
Large, fully equipped bus terminals are located at the terminal stops
of each of the five busways, while medium-sized bus terminals are sited just over 1.24
miles apart along the main axes. These terminals house newspaper kiosks, snack stands,
telephones, postal counters, and small shops, and provide for transfers to and from feeder
and interdistrict bus lines. Adjacent to several of these terminals the city has built
"citizenship streets"—municipal complexes that offer government services.
Services range from unemployment offices to recreational centers. The entire bus system is
color-coded: red for express buses, orange for suburban feeder buses, green for
interdistrict buses that link the suburbs, and yellow for convencional city buses
on local routes.
System operators who collect the fares are paid by the kilometer rather
than by the number of passengers they carry. This results in a balanced distribution of
bus routes and eliminates destructive competition. Passengers pay a single fare to get
into the system, and except for the high-speed dedicated central busway lanes, routes run
along ordinary city streets and do not require excavations or tunnels. The city enforces
bus speeds in key express lanes and bus operators on the main routes can preempt the
traffic signals.
The most innovative features of Curitiba’s network are the tubular
boarding stations on the main routes. Fares are paid at a turnstile in the tube before
boarding the bus over a nearly level ramp. At some stations passengers board at the front
and exit at the rear—a technique that reduces dwell time and increases peak capacity.
Dwell time has been reduced to a mere 19 seconds. The largest double-articulated Volvo
buses in the 2,000-vehicle fleet have 5 lateral doors and hold 270 passengers each,
providing one of the largest bus capacities anywhere in the world. Although there is about
one private automobile per two city residents (one of the highest per capita automobile
ownership rates in Brazil), 75 percent of all commuters—more than 1.3 million
passengers a day—take the bus.
Curitiba tries to maintain the average bus fleet age at 3 years,
helping to hold down bus emissions and contributing to Curitiba’s low level of air
pollution, which is among the lowest in Brazil. The city pays private operators 1 percent
of the value of a bus per month and, after 10 years, takes possession of the retired
vehicles, refurbishes them, and makes them available for human services uses such as
neighborhood day care centers, shelters, and mobile classrooms.
Urbanizacao de Curitiba (URBS). The city’s unusual system
is administered by URBS, a municipal company established as the only franchise holder
under authority of the provincial governor. The company is responsible for managing
contracts of the operators that provide service. URBS establishes routes, sets fares, and
decides on equipment that will be used. It is also responsible for customer service
programs, marketing, and image-based efforts to keep the system growing.
Trolleybus Network (Projected)
Detailed plans have been drawn up by the city for a 36.6-mile
trolleybus network. Designed to further enhance capacity, energy savings, and
environmental benefits, the projected 87 articulated trolleybuses are expected to carry
more than 200,000 passengers a day. The plans may be suspended because of budget
considerations in favor of further expansion of the Ligeirinho (superexpress) articulated,
high-capacity buses, which serve the tube stations along the main corridors.
São Paulo, Brazil
São Paulo is a major transportation hub. Three large airports and
several smaller ones, provide São Paulo with international and domestic service. The
Viaçao Aérea São Paulo (VASP), Brazil's second largest airline is owned by São Paulo
state. Marine transport is provided through the port of Santos. São Paulo is also a hub
of railroads, including a transcontinental line from Santos to Antofagasta, Chile.
Modern highways connect with inland cities, Santos, Rio de Janeiro, and
almost all the states of Brazil. São Paulo’s first freeway was opened in 1969, and
its subway system was inaugurated in 1976. Automobile traffic in the city and suburbs is
heavy. Despite street and highway improvements, congestion is a major and growing problem
that has added to the city's serious air and noise pollution problems.
The transportation mode split in São Paulo is 33 percent private
vehicle, 33 percent transit, and 33 percent pedestrian. Of the ten million plus daily
trips by public transit in the Sao Paulo metropolitan area, 7.9 million are made by bus,
the most popular mode by far. The high percentage of trips made on foot reflects two
factors. One is that in many places, due to horrific traffic congestion, pedestrians move
faster than cars. The other is that São Paulo has neither the resources nor the transit
system capacity to subsidize travel by traditionally disadvantaged groups of riders such
as the elderly or students.
State Secretary for Metropolitan Transport (SMT). The São
Paulo state government has centralized the management of metropolitan area transport under
a single authority—the SMT. This agency sets policy and plans, regulates the conduct
of, and grants concessions for transport operations in the metropolitan region. The SMT
oversees all rail systems and the operators of about 3,500 buses and trolleybuses outside
of São Paulo proper. SMT supervises four agencies which are responsible for train,
subway, bus, and transit planning.
Bus Network
A total of 48 private companies with 54,000 employees provide services
using 11,100 buses over 800 routes in individual fleets that range from 30 to 400
vehicles. Almost 2 billion bus and trolleybus boardings are reported annually. About 66
percent of all daily trips in the metropolitan region are made by public transit. Daily
bus patronage on the major corridors, alone, was 3.2 million in 1996.
São Paulo Transporte SA (SPTrans), State Metropolitan Railways (CPTM),
and Metropolitan Bus Transit Agency (EMTU). Bus and trolleybus services in the
city of São Paulo and most of the metropolitan region are provided by private operators
through service contracts with SPTrans, the municipal transit authority. The metro is
operated by a company jointly owned by the city, state, and federal governments and is
supervised by the SMT. SMT also supervises interurban metropolitan rail and bus services,
provided in a complex arrangement by CPTM and EMTU. SMT is implementing an innovative
regulatory system that will evaluate bus route providers based on a customer satisfaction
survey.
Trolleybus Network
Whereas the catenaries, infrastructure, and vehicles (more than 480)
are owned by the municipality, service is provided by three private operators. The aging
system (the average vehicle is 13 years old) is now undergoing a major overhaul, funded by
SPTrans. There are 18 trolleybus routes, all of which are completely integrated with the
motorbus network, and nearly 50 percent of the bus and trolleybus routes feed metro or
suburban rail stations.
Another 23-mile suburban trolley bus feeder network, managed by a
private operator and separately administered by the EMTU, operates 46 trolleybuses and
transports 350,000 passengers daily.
Busways
The dramatic increase of traffic congestion in the city led to the
development of exclusive busways over the past 20 years. Sixteen dedicated busways
totaling 113 miles are now in operation. Eighteen dedicated transit corridors with 33
interchange terminals are under construction. Services along the busways are operated by
29 private companies with a combined fleet of 1,674 vehicles. Of these, 1,226 are
articulated and 70 are trolleybuses (the majority of the latter are also high-capacity
articulated types). Daily passenger totals are about 3.2 million.
The São Paulo busway model, arrived at after considerable
experimentation, consists of offset islands located to the right of the bus flow in both
directions. High-platform stops allow level access to buses, thereby reducing dwell time,
and vehicles are fitted with extra doors on the left side.
A recent effort to contract out the construction and operation of
future busways to the private sector has run into funding difficulties. The city is now
building more corridors on its own and has asked the operating companies to increase the
capacity of their fleets.
Metro
The Metropolitano de São Paulo (CMSP) claims to be one of only two or
three systems in the world to fully cover its operating costs from farebox revenues. In
1996, revenues were 106 percent of operating expenses. Passenger trips on the 27-mile,
3-route network were 701 million in 1996. The system operates with 588 cars formed into
6-car trains. Access to the system is controlled by electronic turnstiles at the
network’s stations.
Existing metro lines are being extended by two short segments measuring
2.1 and 1.8 miles. This action is expected to generate an additional 190,000 daily trips.
Construction is also underway for Line 4 (5.65 mi, 10 stations) with initial demand
projections of 660,000 additional daily passengers. Partial construction funding has been
obtained from the World Bank.
CMSP controls four major bus terminals that generate nonfare revenues.
In addition, it oversees construction of feeder trolleybus routes. In cooperation with
private sponsors, CMSP also operates a lively station arts and entertainment program.
Suburban Commuter Rail System
CPTM operates a suburban heavy-rail system that carries about 800,000
weekday passengers. The system is divided into east and west branches, which cover 119
miles, 163 stations, and 48.4 miles, 35 stations, respectively. Headways are as low as 4
minutes during peak periods. Modernization and upgrading of the aging electrified network
has been underway for more than a decade.
An additional 30 four-car trains are on order from the GEC
Alsthom/Adtranz/CAF consortium. Discussions are also in progress with Spain’s
national railway to purchase 50 used Class 440 EMUs to be modernized before export. The
current fleet consists of 998 cars formed into 293 trains, not all of which are available
for service. A considerable part of the fleet dates back to 1956 and 1962; the newest cars
are 10 years old.
LESSONS LEARNED
This section focuses on the main strategies and technologies observed
by study mission team members. Specific topics discussed are:
I. Factors for success;
II. Privatization of metro
and commuter rail;
III. Models of government
regulation;
IV. Busway planning,
design, and operation;
V. High fare recovery;
VI. Government enforcement
of bus maintenance; and
VII. Customer service and
users’ opinions.
Factors for Success
The South American cities visited operate highly successful public
transit systems and provide much to learn about moving enormous numbers of passengers
efficiently and effectively. Innovative techniques and supportive factors have yielded bus
transit systems that carry higher peak-hour, peak-direction movements than any light-rail
system in North America. While most of the cities studied have accomplished this with
excellent farebox recovery, vigilant, supportive public policy and continued innovation
will be necessary to sustain the success in the future.
Porto Alegre, Brazil
This metropolitan region has a population of approximately 2.8 million
and, as in other South American cities, extremely high densities are concentrated in major
travel corridors and a compact, multiuse downtown area. Along major travel corridors
served by an exclusive busway system, population densities vary from 15,000 to 50,000
people per square kilometer. Government policy, fuel cost the equivalent of more than US$3
per gallon, and low automobile ownership rates support usage of the mass transit bus
system. The privately operated bus system is supervised by the city’s SMT and carries
approximately 1 million passengers per day.
The hallmark of the Porto Alegre transit system is the low-cost
development of seven radial bus corridors that converge on the city center. Figures 1 and
2 illustrate how the exclusive two-lane busway is built within the median of major
arterial roadways. Median station stops with passenger shelters, which occur every 0.30 to
0.62 miles, are also shown in the figures.
The busway, which is approximately 24 feet in width, can accommodate
extremely high passenger movements that approach 20,000 passengers in the peak-hour,
peak-direction of movement.
Built at approximately $3 million per kilometer, this low-cost
initiative is enhanced by running buses in a convoy to provide frequent service to
multiple destinations (Figure 3). Upon arriving in the central city, the busways serve
major transfer and transit centers which allow convenient transfer to numerous
destinations. One of the major downtown terminals, shown in Figures 4a & b, can
accommodate 48 buses at one time in six bus lanes. This low-cost passenger terminal
accommodates 400,000 passengers per day.
Curitiba, Brazil
Curitiba has become a model city because of its high quality
environmental, social, and physical attributes which are primarily the result of one of
the most successful city and transit planning efforts anywhere in the world during the
20th century.
The plan, conceived in 1965, emphasized the integration of land use,
the road system, and public transportation. It encouraged high-density development along
linear structural axes running in the north-south and east-west directions. A fifth
structural axis has also been developed in the southeast area of the community. The plan
purposely oriented the major freeway system away from the city center to minimize the
impact of automobiles and maximize the use of public transit; it also encouraged a
pedestrian-friendly city.
Despite having one of the highest per capita incomes and automobile
ownership rates in Brazil, the Curitiba bus system carries over 70 percent of all trips
made in the city and cars carry only 22 percent. This has been achieved by the
implementation of an extremely high-performance bus system utilizing 37 miles of exclusive
busways developed by URBS, a public company owned by the municipality of Curitiba. The
median busways (Figure 5) have directly supported the development of high-density,
multiuse buildings along each major structural axis. Densities along the major corridors
approach 30,000 to 50,000 people per square kilometer. This mixed use development
generated even directional splits on the busways, supporting an efficient transit
operation.
The busways utilize a double-articulated vehicle (Figure 6) that is
capable of holding 270 passengers in a crush load. Peak-hour, peak-directional passenger
movement on one of the busways has exceeded 27,000 and is close to saturation. The busways
and their innovative tube-loading stations have been developed at an extremely low cost of
less than $1 million per kilometer. In the downtown area, major streets are dedicated to
transit vehicles and transfer movements (Figure 7) and larger passenger loading tubes
(Figure 8) allow efficient movements of large numbers of passengers. At the ends of most
busways, major terminals are adjacent to "citizenship" streets that integrate
social services with transit (Figure 9).
São Paulo, Brazil
São Paulo operates an extremely efficient rail transit system with an
expanding bus system utilizing low-cost yet very high-performance busways in the outskirts
of the city. A visit to the south side of São Paulo and a tour of EMTU facilities
revealed a network of busways 20.5 miles in length which carry over 240,000 passengers per
day. These busways are an extension of the subway system constructed at lower cost and
capacity. One of the busways visited was 24 feet in width and ran adjacent to or in the
median of arterial roadways, with on-line station stops. The busways also used integration
or transfer terminals at nine different locations. Bus queues approaching one of the major
terminals is shown in Figure 10. Plans are being proposed to expand the system over 185
miles.
São Paulo’s busways serve 20,000 passengers per hour in the peak
direction and have been constructed for approximately $3 million per kilometer. These
busways experience extremely high usage throughout the São Paulo region, in part because
fuel costs are high (equivalent to more than US$3 per gallon) and automobile ownership
rates are relatively low. However, traffic congestion and air pollution are so severe that
the SMT policy favors expansion of subway and commuter rail lines.
Busways provide large savings to the operators relative to the
mixed-traffic bus routes which deal with significant congestion (Figure 10). Additional
environmental improvements are forthcoming with electrification of these metropolitan
corridors and utilization of trolley buses.
Privatization of Metro and Commuter Rail
This section explores the historical and cultural influences that have
led Buenos Aires and São Paulo to their current policies with respect to rail transit. It
also focuses on contracting requirements and how these requirements have made private
operation of rail services desirable to the private sector in Buenos Aires.
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Transit development in Argentina has been influenced by a series of
nationalizations and privatizations that took place throughout this century. In the early
1990s, Argentina developed a program of privatization designed to improve the
infrastructure and increase ridership. Commuter rail was separated from freight rail and
turned over to concession along with the subway system. While under public operation, the
system had deteriorated, resulting in steady losses of ridership and operating deficits.
Since the transition to private operation is still in its early stages
and already threatened by political changes, it is premature to declare the Argentina
model a success. However, the Buenos Aires region has several characteristics favorable to
long-term success for private operation.
The population in Buenos Aires is heavily dependent on public transit
which carries over 50 percent of all daily trips in the region, primarily on bus. The
current privatization effort is designed to move commuters to subway and rail. Automobile
ownership is significantly lower than in the United States. Many can walk to transit. The
cost of fuel and lack of parking facilities encourage even automobile owners to use
transit on a daily basis. Congestion in the inner city is significant and transit is
generally accepted as a viable way to travel in and around the city. These factors combine
to create an appealing opportunity for the private sector. Private operators and
concessionaires can benefit by showing an improvement in system amenities and services,
thereby attracting new rail riders. They also have the opportunity to increase profits by
eliminating the historically high levels of fare evasion common under public operation.
When Argentina first considered privatization, the government was
interested in selling the assets as well as the operation. It was finally determined,
however, that purchasing the assets would be too expensive for the private
concessionaires. Recovering the investment in the assets from the operating revenues would
be impossible. Argentina sought private-sector partners for operation of the rail services
and rehabilitation and construction of rail facilities, but retained ownership of the rail
infrastructure.
The goal of the privatization effort was to attract the private sector.
The contracts featured several items to achieve this goal including long-term contract
opportunities, profit motive, limited investment risk, and aggressive use of concessions.
The request for proposal set out the government’s priorities for service, described
the desired capital improvements, and identified the projects and the schedule for
completion. Private operators were asked to establish subsidy requirements and payment for
fees and set prices for a group of capital projects identified in the proposal. Final
award was based on cost; the winning bid was the lowest cost proposal. Contracts were for
20 to 30 years with additional 10-year options for a total of 40 years. Fares and
provisions for increases, subsidies, and profit margins were established in the contracts.
The government may amend the contracts.
The subway is concessioned to two companies while five companies
operate various commuter lines. The two largest contracts for commuter rail are
Metropolitano and TBA.
Fares are established in the contracts and monitored by the government.
The contracts are structured with strict criteria for fare increases. As a result, profit
must come from increased ridership and improved operation efficiency. Fares may only be
increased for inflation adjustment and improved service. When the operating cost structure
increases by over 6 percent, an adjustment is made for the concessionaire by increasing
the fare or adjusting the subsidy or fee.
Private operators can choose subcontractors for services such as
marketing, retail, and business development. This flexibility in establishing the terms of
the subcontracts also helps the concessionaire make additional profits. The private sector
does not have the right to amend the contract. If the company can do the project for less
than its bid, the company makes an additional profit.
Having a long-term contract makes successful capital investment
attractive to the private sector because they can reap the benefits in increased fares
over the long term. Long-term contracts also allow the private sector to make management
and efficiency decisions based on the long term. This flexibility along with the ability
to retain profits seems to make the private sector willing to take operational risks. On
the capital side, the company makes the initial capital investment and is reimbursed on an
annual basis according to the terms of the contract. Thus, the private investor has only
one year of capital outlay at risk at a time due to the annual reimbursement.
São Paulo, Brazil
São Paulo has taken a very different approach than Buenos Aires in its
rail transit system development. The subway system is fairly new and very similar to
modern systems in the United States such as San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART)
and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). The government continues to
operate the system and is very successful, having one of the largest farebox recovery
rates in the world.
Pressure is mounting, however, to privatize the systems. Most of the
bus systems in Brazil were turned over to the private sector. As an example, one new line
in the São Paulo system is being developed entirely by the private sector as a
build-operate-transfer financing model. The World Bank is a partner with a private
investor who will operate the line for 25 years and then return it to government control.
The attraction to privatization is the same in Brazil as it is in the United
States—the potential for a large infusion of private funds by selling state assets
with the hope of improved service.
In São Paulo, the public sector operates Metro and commuter rail under
the authority of the Secretary of Metropolitan Transport. The Metro system consists of
three lines for a total of 27 miles. The current administration is planning a massive
expansion program, doubling the size of the system with projected ridership exceeding 5
million. São Paulo is clearly emphasizing rail as its desired premiere transit service.
The desirability of bus service is limited because buses compete with automobiles on the
heavily traveled and congested roads. Rail service in São Paulo is in transition. In the
past, commuter rail serviced poorer populations. Today, the state is enhancing and
expanding the system in the hopes of servicing higher economic populations.
Metro costs have gone down due to downsizing and new third-party
negotiations that lowered the costs of contracts and increased ridership. As a result, the
farebox recovery rate has gone from 70 percent to over 100 percent.
Summary
The cities of Buenos Aires and São Paulo have the same goals for their
transit systems—improve service and increase ridership. Their approaches to date are
very different: one is privately serviced while the other is publicly operated. Each
system, however, would be considered a success in the United States for ridership, farebox
recovery rate, and mode share.
Models of Government Regulation
In all of the cities visited, bus and some rail transit operations are
performed by private "concessionaires" under contract to public regulatory
agencies. This section compares and contrasts the different regulatory models observed
among the five cities.
Buenos Aires, Argentina
The twin underpinnings of the regulatory model in Buenos Aires are:
1. Ridership is so strong that low fares still produce profits. Thus,
the possibility of even small fare increases is an effective incentive for improving
performance.
2. Recent experience with public operation of commuter rail and subway
service found it to be inefficient and deteriorating, which led to privatization of these
services.
Transit regulation in Buenos Aires is performed by CNRT, a federal
agency that has only been in existence since 1997. The functions of three formerly
separate commissions responsible for bus, rail, and privatization were merged in CNRT
which "monitors and controls" bus, passenger rail, and freight transport
throughout the country. CNRT has a total employment of 200, with an additional 200
contract personnel. CNRT is organized around seven "managements": customer
service, safety, technical, concession management (i.e., contracting), administration,
legal, and licensing.
With regard to buses, CNRT performs functions similar to the former
U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission—granting operating rights, approving new routes,
setting fares, and enforcing basic safety and environmental standards. Bus transit was
historically privatized in Argentina, with numerous owner-operators of individual buses or
small fleets. In turn, these small operators banded together into colectivos, establishing
a pattern of consolidation that continues today.
CNRT is not nearly as involved in many aspects of bus operations as its
counterpart agencies in other cities. CNRT’s vision is for continued consolidation
among the hundred or so remaining enterprises.
CNRT regulates bus operators in terms of safety, air pollution, and
customer service. The city’s 10-year bus life requirement is the principal means of
improving emissions and safety. CNRT has also issued technical specifications for bus
emissions that are enforced through 6-month and random vehicle inspections by field
personnel.
Interestingly, the requirement to replace buses after 10 years, which
is just now taking effect, will almost certainly impact some undercapitalized companies
that cannot afford new vehicles. The less profitable companies will be absorbed by others,
resulting in better service for users.
In terms of rail services, CNRT controls the concessionaire through a
quality index that reflects the numbers of coaches operated, service reliability, and
on-time performance. Favorable performance is "rewarded" by the granting of fare
increases; adverse performance results in financial penalties.
With regard to the regulatory environment, a few observations are
noteworthy. While the municipal govern-ment has little control over the subway operation,
municipal police authorities provide the primary enforcement to prevent fare evasion. The
most recent increases authorized by CNRT were opposed by the municipal administration,
which is apparently now refusing to help police fare collection. Negotiations between
federal and city agencies are underway. This suggests the same kind of policy disagreement
between different levels of government that were observed in São Paulo (and that was so
markedly absent in Curitiba).
For Metrovias, this translates into CNRT exercising more regulatory
oversight of subway versus bus operations because the rail system still receives an
operating subsidy. Metrovias’s concession contract was considerably more involved on
such issues as vehicle maintenance and technical specifications.
In the oversight of CNRT-sponsored capital projects, CNRT is very
involved in technical details (e.g., deciding which type of ties to use in a rail
renovation project). On the other hand, once projects are underway, CNRT is far less
involved in financial and subcontracting issues.
In summary, the regulatory model in Buenos Aires is best described as a
work in progress. CNRT is still early in its development.
Montevideo, Uruguay
Regulatory oversight of bus transit is provided by the Division of
Transit and Transportation of the city of Montevideo. Under Montevideo’s "magic
formula," the municipality sets fares at a level sufficient to cover operating
expenses, including the lease cost for new vehicles and a 6 percent profit. The
municipality also pays about $18 million per year in operating subsidies that include
reimbursement for discounted "social fares" (i.e., reductions of up to 70
percent for senior citizens and low-income riders).
In recent years, private operators obtained new buses on a lease basis
financed by the National Bank of Uruguay. In effect, the bank owns title to the vehicles,
and operators pay a monthly mortgage. Between 1990 and 1995, over 60 percent of the bus
fleet in Montevideo was replaced through this mechanism. Unfortunately, the bank financing
was also a one-time deal. How bus replacement will be financed in the future is uncertain.
Moreover, private operators expressed dissatisfaction that the formula apparently does not
take into account their interest expense on the leases.
In contrast to Buenos Aires, where high ridership is a central element
of the financing formula for transit, Montevideo has experienced a continuing decline.
Total transit ridership decreased from 500 million annual passengers in 1960 to 300
million in 1997, and municipal officials estimate the decline since 1994 at about 2
percent per year. Most of the decline is attributed to unemployment and general economic
conditions that have closed some local industries, although increasing automobile use is
also a factor. (Interestingly, the last thing the study mission’s bus passed en route
to the Montevideo airport was a giant new shopping center surrounded by acres of parking
lots and the sign for a fast-food drive-through!)
While the formula seems to be a serviceable arrangement for the moment,
the municipal authority is seeking to implement two initiatives that represent fundamental
changes in the current transit system. One is to substantially reduce competition between
operators for passengers on trunk lines served by multiple bus routes. The municipality
grants route permits to the various operators for 10-year periods, after which the city is
theoretically free to restructure the entire system.
Clearly, the permits initially granted were for the operators’
existing service. In many places, several routes operate along the same arterial streets,
creating duplication of service and competition for passengers. Restructuring will not
only alleviate this competition, but it will facilitate the second initiative which is to
increase service in low-density areas outside the central city.
The municipality’s ultimate goal is to merge what it views as five
separate companies into one regional transit system with more integration of management
and more coordination of service. A key element of the second initiative is to establish
new bus terminals in outlying areas served by feeder lines. While the municipality pays
the cost of constructing the terminals, the individual operators are required to pay for
maintenance.
The emphasis on improving service to low-density areas outside the
central city clearly reflects the administration’s "social concept." In
Montevideo, as in the other South American cities visited—and in contrast to many
U.S. cities—these outlying areas are where the largest numbers of low-income people
reside. Reducing redundant service in the central city and redirecting resources to
increase service in outlying areas is a high priority in the current administration.
Porto Alegre, Brazil
In Porto Alegre, regulation of transit service is performed by SMT, a
municipal agency, which, like its counterpart in Montevideo, was established in 1989 when
the current labor party won control of the government. The system at that time was
characterized by stiff competition among private operators, with a badly deteriorated
vehicle fleet. Unlike Montevideo, however, 10 years of public regulation has achieved a
significant transformation of the system into a world-class bus operation. The average age
of buses in Porto Alegre is currently 4 years, with the oldest ones only 6 years old. All
buses are subject to examination by SMT inspectors every 45 days.
Porto Alegre is a prosperous industrial city, and a major port. Transit
ridership remains robust to the point that farebox revenue supports all of the private bus
operations, although the municipality provides a considerable subsidy for the rail line.
Bus operators are reimbursed on a per-kilometer basis.
The most remarkable aspect of transit regulation in Porto Alegre is a
new automatic monitoring system, SOMA, that is now being implemented at the city’s
expense. When it is completed, all 1,500 buses will carry transponders that communicate
with 45 signposts throughout the city. The system will eventually interface with automatic
passenger counters aboard the buses.
Among all the cities visited, Porto Alegre was the only one in which
the municipal regulatory agency was substantially investing in technology.
Curitiba, Brazil
Regulation of private transit operators in Curitiba is performed by the
URBS. Although there are 10 private providers who operate under long-term concessions from
URBS, their identities are virtually invisible, except for a small notation on the buses.
URBS specifies the types of buses to be used on each route and has established a renowned
color-coding system to distinguish buses used in different types of service.
All farebox revenue is turned over to URBS, and, in turn, the operators
are reimbursed according to a per-kilometer formula that is calculated separately for each
type of vehicle. The formulas are truly comprehensive, including everything from
employees’ uniforms (at about $0.003 per km), to a flat 13 percent administration
allowance, to depreciation on vehicles and profit for the companies. As in other cities,
operators can increase profits by achieving efficiency improvements. Profits are about 8
percent to 10 percent per year. The same operators have been in business so long that they
hold titles to all their own facilities. Thus, it is difficult for any new enterprise to
enter into competition with the existing providers.
Interestingly, although the reimbursement formula includes an amount
for depreciation, some operators have apparently found it more remunerative to pocket the
depreciation and finance new vehicles on a lease basis.
São Paulo, Brazil
São Paulo has two separate mechanisms for regulating transit. One is
the state of São Paulo whose Metropolitan Transport is responsible for four departments:
EMTU, CPTM, Metro, and EMPLASA. The state-regulated operations carry about 56 percent of
total metropolitan-area ridership.
The other is the city of São Paulo whose SPTrans oversees 60 private
companies operating 11,000 buses within the city proper. The city-regulated operations
carry about 44 percent of total ridership.
There is currently significant conflict between the two agencies. The
main cause of the division between state and city is political. Simply put, the two
principal rival political parties in São Paulo each control one level of government. In
this politically charged atmosphere, a lack of cooperation and coordination between the
two enormous mass transportation networks has unfortunately resulted.
Three broad initiatives are being undertaken by the state for its
portion of the regional system: (1) a very clear emphasis on rail, (2) massively
restructuring the bus service regulated by EMTU, and (3) substituting public opinion polls
for governmental inspection as the basis of incentives and penalties for performance. This
last initiative would result in a major reduction in "governmental interference"
in day-to-day bus operations. Concessionaires would be required to pay for independent
surveys of public opinion on such attributes as on-time performance and the cleanliness of
buses.
SPTrans uses Total Quality Management (TQM) tech-niques to measure
customer satisfaction. Concession contracts with the 60 companies signed in 1994
specifically require participation in the quality management program, PQTU, with results
to be measured using the Malcolm Baldridge Award criteria. The first round of PQTU
evaluations was performed in November 1995, and subsequent rounds are performed annually.
There has been a marked increase in quality measured from each round to the next.
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