

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

AMERICAN FREEDOM DEFENSE
INITIATIVE; PAMELA GELLER; and
ROBERT SPENCER,

Plaintiffs,

-v.-

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA
TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

Defendant.

Case No.

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER /
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiffs American Freedom Defense Initiative (“AFDI”), Pamela Geller, and Robert Spencer (collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”) hereby will and do move the court for the immediate entry of a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) / preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to permit Plaintiffs to engage in their First Amendment free speech activity by displaying a pro-Israel/anti-jihad advertisement on dioramas of Defendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”), beginning on September 24, 2012 and running through October 21, 2012 pursuant to the terms of the Advertiser Agreement entered into between CBS Outdoor, the advertising agency acting on behalf of Defendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”), and Plaintiffs.

On September 18, 2012, the WMATA informed Plaintiffs that it was not going to run Plaintiffs’ advertisement during the agreed upon time period due to “world events” and an unfounded “concern for the security of their passengers.”

As set forth more fully in Plaintiffs' memorandum of points and authorities in support of this motion, by delaying Plaintiffs' speech "to a future date to be determined" on account of "world events," the WMATA is censoring Plaintiffs' core political speech on the basis of its content and viewpoint. That is, the WMATA does not want to display a message that it deems to be critical of Islam, critical of jihad, or supportive of Israel in light of these "world events." However, it is precisely because of the current political situation unfolding in Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere that Plaintiffs should be permitted to express their message, and any delay amounts to government censorship of core political speech.

Indeed, the WMATA's speech restriction is based on the perceived negative response that Plaintiffs' message might receive from certain viewers based on its content and viewpoint. However, a viewer's reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation. This is known as a "heckler's veto," which is impermissible under the First Amendment.

Under the First Amendment, speech cannot be punished or banned simply because it might offend a hostile mob. By delaying the display of Plaintiffs' advertisement because of its message, the WMATA is punishing Plaintiffs' speech based on its content and viewpoint in violation of the First Amendment.

Pursuant to clearly established First Amendment jurisprudence, the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury sufficient to warrant this court granting the requested TRO.

RULE 65(b) NOTICE

As set forth in the declaration of Plaintiff Geller, which is filed as Exhibit 1 in support of Plaintiffs' motion, and as argued further in the accompanying memorandum, by delaying Plaintiffs' right to engage in core political speech that is timely and exceedingly relevant in light

of the current “world events,” the WMATA is causing irreparable harm to Plaintiffs as a matter of law. *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, *for even minimal periods of time*, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”) (emphasis added). Consequently, Plaintiffs will suffer “immediate and irreparable injury . . . before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Therefore, it would be appropriate for this court to issue the requested TRO without written or oral notice to the WMATA.

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs are attempting to immediately and personally serve this motion upon the WMATA, and if successful, Plaintiffs will promptly file the affidavit/certificate of service with the court.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs hereby request that the court grant their motion and issue the requested temporary restraining order / preliminary injunction.

Respectfully submitted,

AMERICAN FREEDOM LAW CENTER



Robert J. Muise, Esq. (D.C. Court Bar No. MI 0052)
P.O. Box 131098
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48113
Tel: (734) 635-3756
rmuise@americanfreedomlawcenter.org

/s/ David Yerushalmi
David Yerushalmi, Esq. (DC Bar No. 978179)
1901 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 201
Washington, D.C. 20001
david.yerushalmi@verizon.net
Tel: (646) 262-0500
Fax: (801) 760-3901

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

AMERICAN FREEDOM DEFENSE
INITIATIVE; PAMELA GELLER; and
ROBERT SPENCER,

Plaintiffs,

-v.-

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA
TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

Defendant.

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER /
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS..... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii

INTRODUCTION 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS 1

ARGUMENT 5

I. PLAINTIFFS’ POLITICAL SPEECH RESTS ON THE HIGHEST RUNG OF
THE HIERARCHY OF FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES..... 5

II. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A TRO TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE
HARM TO THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 6

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits..... 6

1. Plaintiffs’ Advertisement Is Protected Speech 6

2. Forum Analysis 7

3. Application of the Appropriate Standard 10

B. Irreparable Harm to Plaintiffs without the TRO 14

C. Harm to Others if the TRO Is Granted..... 14

D. The Public Interest 15

CONCLUSION..... 16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth.,
 No. 11 Civ. 6774 (PAE), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101274, (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2012)7

Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth.,
 No. 11 Civ. 6774 (PAE), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123112, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012)15

Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg’l Transp.,
 No. 10-121342011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35083 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2011)9

Boos v. Barry,
 485 U.S. 312 (1988)12

Cantwell v. Conn.,
 310 U.S. 296 (1940)5

Carey v. Brown,
 447 U.S. 455 (1980).....5

Cohen v. Cal.,
 403 U.S. 15 (1971)12, 13

Connick v. Myers,
 461 U.S. 138 (1983).....5

Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm. of N.Y.,
 477 U.S. 530 (1980)11

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund,
 473 U.S. 788 (1985)7, 8, 11, 14

Cogswell v. City of Seattle,
 347 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2003)14

Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Fisher,
 70 F.3d 1474 (6th Cir. 1995)16

**Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n*,
 844 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D.D.C. 2012)6

**Elrod v. Burns*,
 427 U.S. 347 (1976)11, 14, 15

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205 (1975)12

**Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement*,
505 U.S. 123 (1992)11, 12

Glasson v. Louisville,
518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1975)13

G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor control Comm’n,
23 F.3d 1071 (6th Cir. 1994)16

Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S. 496 (1939)8

Hill v. Col.,
530 U.S. 703 (2000)6

**Lebron v. Wash. Metro. Transit. Auth.*,
749 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1984).....7, 9, 10

Lewis v. Wilson,
253 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2001)11, 12

McNeese v. Bd. of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668 (1963).....4

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886 (1982)5

N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth.,
136 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1998)7, 9, 14

Newsome v. Norris,
888 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1989)14

Nieto v. Flatau,
715 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D.N.C. 2010).....9, 14

Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators,
460 U.S. 37 (1983)8, 9, 11

Planned Parenthood Ass’n/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Auth.,
767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985)10

Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Meese,
639 F. Supp. 581 (D.D.C. 1986).....16

Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92 (1972)11

R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377 (1992)11

Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (1997)13

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819 (1995)11

Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105 (1991)12

S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark,
152 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 1998)11

Stromberg v. Cal.,
283 U.S. 359 (1931).....5

Terminiello v. City of Chicago,
337 U.S. 1 (1949)12

United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth.,
163 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 1998)7, 10

United States v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171 (1983)6, 7

Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172 (1985).....4

Constitution

U.S. Const. amend. I5

INTRODUCTION

This case challenges the WMATA's restriction on Plaintiffs' right to engage in protected speech in a public forum created by the WMATA based on the content and viewpoint of Plaintiffs' message (hereinafter "Free Speech Restriction").

The issue presented in this motion is whether delaying Plaintiffs' right to engage in political speech based on its content and viewpoint to an unknown "future date" that is acceptable to the WMATA causes irreparable harm to justify issuing a temporary restraining order. As demonstrated below, the relevant facts and law compel the granting of this motion.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiffs Geller and Spencer are co-founders of Plaintiff American Freedom Defense Initiative ("AFDI"), which is incorporated under the laws of the State of New Hampshire. Plaintiff Geller is the Executive Director of AFDI, and Plaintiff Spencer is the Associate Director. Plaintiffs Geller and Spender engage in political speech through AFDI's activities, including AFDI's advertising campaign, as described below. (Geller Decl. at ¶ 2 at Ex. 1).

AFDI exercises its right to freedom of speech and promotes its objectives through an advertising campaign which involves purchasing advertising space on transit authority property in major cities throughout the United States, including Washington, D.C. AFDI purchases these advertisements to express its message on current events and public issues, particularly including issues involving Islam, sharia, Israel, and the Middle East. (Geller Decl. at ¶ 3 at Ex. 1).

The WMATA has leased its advertising space for political and social commentary advertisements covering a broad spectrum of political views and ideas. (Geller Decl. at ¶ 4 at Ex. 1).

For example, the WMATA has leased its advertising space for a political advertisement that was pro-Palestine and anti-Israel and which displayed the message: “End U.S. military aid to Israel” (hereinafter referred to as “Anti-Israel Advertisement”). (Geller Decl. at ¶ 5 at Ex. 1).

Pursuant to the WMATA’s policy of permitting political and social commentary on its advertising space and particularly in light of the fact that the WMATA displayed the Anti-Israel Advertisement, AFDI submitted for approval an advertisement that stated, “In Any War Between the Civilized Man and the Savage, Support the Civilized Man. Support Israel. Defeat Jihad.” (hereinafter referred to as “Pro-Israel Advertisement”). (Geller Decl. at ¶ 6, Ex. A, at Ex. 1).

AFDI’s Pro-Israel Advertisement is political speech in direct response to the Anti-Israel Advertisement. The Anti-Israeli Advertisement suggests that Israel’s military is the impediment to peace between the Israelis and Palestinians and that U.S. military aid to Israel also acts as an impediment to peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. In other words, the Anti-Israel Advertisement blames Israel, its military, and U.S. military aid to Israel as the cause of Palestinian terror directed against innocent civilians in Israel and abroad. (Geller Decl. at ¶ 7 at Ex. 1).

AFDI’s Pro-Israel Advertisement presents the message that there is no comparison or equivalence between savage civilian-targeting violence and Israel’s civilized struggle for survival in a part of the world where civilized behavior is overshadowed by terrorism and violence, as evidenced by the current world events playing out in Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere. (Geller Decl. at ¶ 8 at Ex. 1).

AFDI’s Pro-Israel Advertisement is very timely in light of these current events in which Muslims are engaging in violent jihad in response to America’s policy toward the Middle East and to allegedly protest speech deemed critical of Islam. (Geller Decl. at ¶ 9 at Ex. 1).

AFDI's Pro-Israel Advertisement was approved for display on the WMATA advertising space. The advertisement satisfied all of the WMATA's guidelines for acceptable advertising. (Geller Decl. at ¶ 10 at Ex. 1).

Accordingly, on September 6, 2012, AFDI entered into a contract with CBS Outdoor, which acts as the advertising agency for the WMATA, to place the Pro-Israel Advertisement on four dioramas. Pursuant to the contract, the "advertising period" for the display was to begin on September 24, 2012 and end on October 21, 2012. (Geller Decl. at ¶ 11, Ex. B, at Ex. 1).

Under the contract, the "period cost" for the display of AFDI's Pro-Israel Advertisement was \$5,600, which AFDI promptly paid via credit card on September 10, 2012. (Geller Decl. at ¶ 12 at Ex. 1).

In reliance upon this contract, AFDI purchased and printed the advertisements. Consequently, prior to September 18, 2012, the advertisements were ready for display on the WMATA dioramas beginning September 24, 2012, pursuant to the terms of the contract. (Geller Decl. at ¶ 13 at Ex. 1).

On September 18, 2012, however, Plaintiff Geller received an email from Mr. Howard Marcus, the CBS Outdoor agent working on behalf of the WMATA. In this email, Mr. Marcus informed Plaintiff Geller of the following: "The DC Transit Authority has informed me today that due to the situations happening around the world at this time, we are postponing the start of this program to a future date to be determined." (Geller Decl. at ¶ 14 at Ex. 1).

Plaintiff Geller promptly responded to Mr. Marcus' email the same day, advising him that she wanted to see the WMATA's refusal to run AFDI's advertisement during the contract period from the WMATA itself. Plaintiff Geller also made it very clear to Mr. Marcus that he needed to convey to the WMATA the importance of the timing of the advertisement, stating, "It

is precisely because of the current political situation that it is important that I be able to express my message now and that I consider any delay to be government censorship of my core political speech.” Consequently, Plaintiff Geller demanded that the WMATA change its position. (Geller Decl. at ¶ 15 at Ex. 1).

Mr. Marcus responded that same day, confirming that the WMATA was not going to change its position, citing “world events and a concern for the security of their passengers” as the basis for “deferring” the display of AFDI’s advertisement. Specifically, Mr. Marcus wrote in his email the following: “The DC Transit Authority has asked me to pass along the below: The advertiser should be assured that Metro is not refusing to run the ad, they are merely deferring it due to world events and a concern for the security of their passengers. The advertiser is welcome to appeal the decision in writing.”¹ (Geller Decl. at ¶ 16 at Ex. 1).

AFDI objects to the WMATA’s censorship, which is effectively suppressing the message AFDI is attempting to express based on a perceived negative response to its content and viewpoint by certain viewers. Consequently, AFDI objects to this content- and viewpoint-based restriction on its speech. (Geller Decl. at ¶ 17 at Ex. 1).

¹ It is important to note, at least by way of a footnote, that Plaintiffs are not required to “appeal” the WMATA’s adverse decision prior to seeking relief in this court. There is no requirement for Plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies prior to challenging a decision that inflicts an actual, concrete injury in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In *McNeese v. Bd. of Educ.*, 373 U.S. 668, 672 (1963), the Court emphasized that the congressional purpose in enacting § 1983 was “to provide a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to any remedy any State might have” and rejected the argument that failure to exhaust administrative remedies barred suit in federal court under § 1983. See also *Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City*, 473 U.S. 172, 192-93 (1985) (“[T]he finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate.”). Here, it is evident that the WMATA has arrived at a “definitive position” that has “inflict[ed] an actual, concrete injury,” such that an administrative appeal is not required. And notwithstanding the relevant law, there is no such appeal process under the contract.

ARGUMENT

I. PLAINTIFFS' POLITICAL SPEECH RESTS ON THE HIGHEST RUNG OF THE HIERARCHY OF FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES.

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to freedom of speech is protected from infringement by States and their political subdivisions, such as the WMATA, by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. *See Cantwell v. Conn.*, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).

The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that the freedom of speech is a fundamental right that is essential to our republican form of government. As the Court noted, “[Speech] concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” *NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.*, 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (citations omitted); *see also Stromberg v. Cal.*, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (“The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”).

Here, Plaintiffs’ speech in the form of advertisements directed at U.S. foreign policy is classic political speech, which is accorded the highest constitutional protection. In *Connick v. Myers*, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), the Court noted that “speech on public issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,’ and is entitled to special protection.” *Id.* at 145 (quoting *Claiborne Hardware Co.*, 458 U.S. at 913 (1982) & *Carey v. Brown*, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).

Because the WMATA censored Plaintiffs’ core political speech, Plaintiffs are entitled to a TRO to prevent irreparable harm to their First Amendment freedoms.

II. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A TRO TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE HARM TO THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS.

When deciding this motion for a TRO, the court must consider whether Plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating that (1) they have “a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits” of their First Amendment claim; (2) they “will suffer irreparable harm if the [TRO] is not granted”; (3) “other interested parties will not suffer substantial harm if the [TRO] is granted”; and (4) “the public interest would be furthered by the [TRO].” *Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 98, 101 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal quotations and citation omitted). These are the same factors the court would consider when ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction. *Id.* “The likelihood of success requirement is the most important of these factors.” *Id.*

Whether a party is likely to succeed on the merits of a free speech claim is examined in essentially three steps. First, the court must determine whether the speech in question—Plaintiffs’ Pro-Israel Advertisement—is protected speech. Second, the court must conduct an analysis as to the forum in question to determine the proper constitutional standard to apply. And third, the court must then determine whether the free speech restriction comports with the applicable standard.

Upon application of this analysis, the court should issue the requested TRO to preserve and protect Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to freedom of speech and to prevent irreparable harm.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits.

1. Plaintiffs’ Advertisement Is Protected Speech.

The first question is easily answered. Conveying a political or religious message with signs constitutes protected speech under the First Amendment. *See Hill v. Colo.*, 530 U.S. 703, 714-15 (2000) (“[S]ign displays . . . are protected by the First Amendment.”); *United States v.*

Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1983) (demonstrating with signs constitutes speech under the First Amendment). This includes signs posted on the advertising space of city transit authorities such as the WMATA. See *Lebron v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.*, 749 F.2d 893, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1984); *N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth.*, 136 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1998); *United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth.*, 163 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 1998); *Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth.*, No. 11 Civ. 6774 (PAE), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101274, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2012) (stating in case involving the same Pro-Israel Advertisement at issue here that “[a]s a threshold matter, the Court notes that the AFDI Ad is not only protected speech—it is core political speech”).

One additional point to bear in mind is the fact that the WMATA’s restriction here is operating as a *prior restraint*. *Lebron*, 749 F.2d at 896 (holding that the refusal to display the poster “because of its content is a clearcut prior restraint”). Consequently, the “WMATA *carries a heavy burden* of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.” *Id.* (internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis added).

2. Forum Analysis.

To determine the extent of Plaintiffs’ free speech rights in this matter, the court must next engage in a First Amendment forum analysis. “The [Supreme] Court has adopted a forum analysis as a means of determining when the Government’s interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for [expressive] purposes.” *Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund*, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). Forum analysis has traditionally divided government property into three general categories: traditional public forums, designated public forums, and nonpublic forums.

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. Once the forum is identified, the court must then determine whether the speech restriction is justified by the requisite standard. *Id.*

On one end of the spectrum lies the traditional public forum. Traditional public forums, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are places that “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” *Hague v. CIO*, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). This forum is not implicated here.

Next on the spectrum is the designated public forum, which exists when the government intentionally opens its property for expressive activity. *Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators*, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983). As the Supreme Court stated, “[A] public forum may be created by government designation of a place or channel of communication for use by the public at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects.” *Cornelius*, 473 U.S. at 802.

A designated public forum is created when the government “intentionally open[s] a nontraditional forum for public discourse.” *Cornelius*, 473 U.S. at 802. To discern the government’s intent, courts “look[] to the policy and practice of the government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public forum,” as well as “the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity.” *Id.* In a traditional or designated public forum, restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny. *Id.* at 800 (“[S]peakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. . . . Similarly, when the government has intentionally designated a place or means of

communication as a public forum speakers cannot be excluded without a compelling government interest.”).

At the opposite end of the spectrum is the nonpublic forum. The nonpublic forum is “[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication.” *Perry Educ. Ass’n*, 460 U.S. at 46. In a nonpublic forum, the government “may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” *Id.* Thus, even in a nonpublic forum, a speech restriction must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral to pass constitutional muster. *Id.*; see *Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg’l Transp.*, No. 10-121342011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35083 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2011) (granting preliminary injunction and holding that while the bus advertising space was a limited public forum, the speech restriction was unreasonable); see also *Nieto v. Flatau*, 715 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (holding that a speech restriction on a military base, a nonpublic forum, was viewpoint based as applied to anti-Islam speech in violation of the First Amendment).

The D.C. Circuit has already determined that the forum at issue here (*i.e.*, the free-standing dioramas of the WMATA) is a designated public forum. See *Lebron*, 749 F.2d at 896 (holding that there is no “question that WMATA has converted its subway stations into public fora by accepting other political advertising”). Other circuits analyzing similar transit authority advertising policies and practices have also concluded that the advertising space at issue was a designated public forum subject to strict scrutiny. See *N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth.*, 136 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1998) (concluding that the advertising space was a public forum where the transit authority permitted “political and other non-commercial advertising

generally”); *United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099*, 163 F.3d at 355 (concluding that the transit advertising space was a public forum and stating that “[a]cceptance of political and public-issue advertisements, which by their very nature generate conflict, signals a willingness on the part of the government to open the property to controversial speech”); *Planned Parenthood Ass’n/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Auth.*, 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985) (concluding that the advertising space became a public forum where the transit authority permitted advertising on “a wide variety of commercial, public-service, public-issue, and political ads”).

Here, the WMATA unquestionably accepts a wide variety of commercial, public-service, public-issue, and political advertisements. *See Lebron*, 749 F.2d at 894, n.2 (noting the district court’s finding that the “WMATA has ‘rented subway advertising space for political and social commentary advertisements covering a broad spectrum of political views and ideas’”). Clearly, as the evidence presented here demonstrates, the WMATA does not limit its advertising to purely commercial advertisements for revenue-generation purposes only, and it continues its practice of permitting political advertisements. Consequently, the forum at issue is a designated public forum, triggering the strict scrutiny standard for the WMATA’s content- and viewpoint-based speech restriction.

3. Application of the Appropriate Standard.

In a designated public forum, similar to a traditional public forum, the government’s ability to restrict speech is sharply limited. The government may enforce reasonable, *content neutral* time, place, and manner regulations of speech if the regulations are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leave open ample alternative channels of

communication.² *Perry Educ. Ass'n*, 460 U.S. at 45. However, content-based restrictions on speech, such as the restriction at issue here, are subject to strict scrutiny. *Cornelius*, 473 U.S. at 800. That is, content restrictions on speech are only permissible when they are “necessary to serve a compelling state interest” and “narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.” *Id.* For “[i]t is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys.” *Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.*, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). Content-based restrictions “are presumptively unconstitutional.” *S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark*, 152 F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, the government may not “impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects” or on the basis of “hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.” *R.A.V. v. St. Paul*, 505 U.S. 377, 386-92 (1992); see *Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley*, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (holding that the government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express more controversial views).

To determine whether a restriction is content-based, the courts look at whether it “restrict(s) expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” *Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm. of N.Y.*, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980). Here, the restriction is content based because the WMATA restricted Plaintiffs’ speech based on the subjective belief that others might object to Plaintiffs’ message. Indeed, the Supreme Court has long held that a listener’s (or, in this case, viewer’s) reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation. *Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement*, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992). “The First Amendment knows no heckler’s veto.” *Lewis v. Wilson*, 253 F.3d 1077, 1082 (8th Cir.

² Consequently, any argument that the WMATA is simply imposing a “time” restriction is unavailing because the restriction is nonetheless content-based and thus subject to strict scrutiny. Indeed, even a momentary loss of First Amendment freedoms constitutes irreparable harm sufficient to warrant injunctive relief. *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).

2001). While restrictions on speech because of the “secondary effects” that the speech creates are sometimes permissible, an effect from speech is not secondary if it arises from the content of the speech or the viewpoint of the speaker. “The emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a ‘secondary effect.’” *Boos v. Barry*, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (opinion of O’Connor, J.).

In *Terminiello v. City of Chicago*, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), the Supreme Court famously stated,

[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech . . . is . . . protected against censorship or punishment. . . . There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view.

Id. at 4. Therefore, the fact that Plaintiffs’ speech may actually offend some people does not lessen its constitutionally protected status; it enhances it. “The fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection.” *Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.*, 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (citations omitted); *Forsyth Cnty.*, 505 U.S. at 135 (noting that speech cannot be “punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob”); *Hill*, 530 U.S. at 715 & 710, n.7 (“The fact that the messages conveyed by [the signs] may be offensive to their recipients does not deprive them of constitutional protection.”).

Indeed, “the Constitution does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer.” *Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville*, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975). Rather than censoring the speaker, the burden rests with the viewer to “avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes.” *Cohen v. Cal.*, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). As the *Cohen* Court

noted, “[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.” *Id.* at 26. In fact, First Amendment protection even extends to regulatory schemes that would allow a disapproving citizen to silence a disagreeable speaker by complaining on other, apparently neutral, grounds. *See Reno v. ACLU*, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997) (holding that the prohibition on knowingly communicating indecent material to minors in Internet forums was invalid because it conferred “broad powers of censorship, in the form of a ‘heckler’s veto,’ upon any opponent of indecent speech who might simply log on and inform the would-be discourses that his 17-year-old-child . . . would be present”).

Thus, pursuant to the First Amendment, the government is not permitted to affirm the heckler; rather, it must protect the speaker and punish those who react lawlessly to a controversial message. As the Sixth Circuit observed, “[The government] has the duty not to ratify and effectuate a heckler’s veto nor may he join a moiling mob intent on suppressing ideas. Instead, he must take reasonable action to protect . . . persons exercising their constitutional rights.” *Glasson v. Louisville*, 518 F.2d 899, 906 (6th Cir. 1975). In sum, the WMATA cannot, consistent with the Constitution, restrict Plaintiffs’ message because it or other viewers might find it offensive. Otherwise, the government “would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.” *Cohen*, 403 U.S. at 21.

Moreover, the WMATA has restricted Plaintiffs’ advertisement not only on the basis of its content, which is impermissible in a designated public forum, but on the basis of the viewpoint expressed by Plaintiffs, which is fatal in any forum. When speech “fall[s] within an acceptable subject matter otherwise included in the forum, the State may not legitimately exclude

it from the forum based on the viewpoint of the speaker.” *Cogswell v. City of Seattle*, 347 F.3d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, viewpoint discrimination occurs when the government “denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject,” *Cornelius*, 473 U.S. at 806, as in this case. Here, there is no question that the subject matter (U.S. foreign policy toward Israel) is permissible; however, the WMATA restricted Plaintiffs’ speech because of its viewpoint toward that includable subject. *Nieto*, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 650 (holding that a speech restriction was viewpoint based as applied to anti-Islam speech in violation of the First Amendment). Therefore, the restriction is viewpoint based and unconstitutional.

In sum, Plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of their First Amendment claim.

B. Irreparable Harm to Plaintiffs without the TRO.

As the U.S. Supreme Court has long held, “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); *see also N.Y. Magazine*, 136 F.3d at 127 (upon establishing a violation of the First Amendment, the plaintiff “established *a fortiori* . . . irreparable injury”); *Newsome v. Norris*, 888 F.2d 371, 378 (6th Cir. 1989) (“The Supreme Court has unequivocally admonished that even minimal infringement upon First Amendment values constitutes irreparable injury sufficient to justify injunctive relief.”) (citing *Elrod*). Consequently, Plaintiffs have established that they will be irreparably harmed absent the requested TRO.

C. Harm to Others if the TRO Is Granted.

In this case, the likelihood of harm to Plaintiffs is substantial because Plaintiffs intend only to peacefully exercise their First Amendment right to freedom of speech in a public forum,

and the deprivation of this right, even for minimal periods, constitutes irreparable injury as a matter of law. *Elrod*, 427 U.S. at 373.

On the other hand, if the WMATA is restrained from enforcing their free speech restriction against Plaintiffs, it will suffer no harm because the exercise of constitutionally protected expression can never harm any of the WMATA's or others' legitimate interests. Indeed, the WMATA's speculative fear of causing offense to others in light of the "world events" unfolding overseas cannot overcome its "heavy burden" to justify the imposition of its prior restraint on Plaintiffs' speech. *Lebron*, 749 F.2d at 896. If safety concerns do rise to the level of a compelling interest, which is unlikely since this very advertisement has run, and will again soon be running, in other major U.S. cities, including New York, *see Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth.*, No. 11 Civ. 6774 (PAE), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123112, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012) (enjoining speech restriction and ordering the display of AFDI's Pro-Israel Advertisement in New York City), the WMATA always has the option of taking down the advertisements.

In the final analysis, the question of harm to others as well as the impact on the public interest generally cannot be addressed properly in the First Amendment context without first determining if there is a constitutional violation. For if Plaintiffs show that their First Amendment right to freedom of speech has been violated, then the harm to others is inconsequential.

D. The Public Interest.

The impact of the TRO on the public interest turns in large part on whether Plaintiffs' constitutional rights are violated by the WMATA's speech restriction. As courts, including this one, have noted, "[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party's

constitutional rights.” *G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n*, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994); *Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Meese*, 639 F. Supp. 581, 587 (D.D.C. 1986) (“[T]he Court notes that it is in the public interest to uphold a constitutionally guaranteed right.”); *see also Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Fisher*, 70 F.3d 1474, 1490 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “the public as a whole has a significant interest in ensuring equal protection of the laws and protection of First Amendment liberties”).

Thus, because the WMATA’s speech restriction violates Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to freedom of speech, it is in the public interest to grant the TRO.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs are entitled to a TRO / preliminary injunction enjoining the WMATA’s Free Speech Restriction, thereby allowing Plaintiffs to exercise their fundamental right to freedom of speech through the display of their Pro-Israel Advertisement beginning on September 24, 2012.

AMERICAN FREEDOM LAW CENTER



Robert J. Muike, Esq. (D.C. Court Bar No. MI 0052)
P.O. Box 131098
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48113
Tel: (734) 635-3756
rmuise@americanfreedomlawcenter.org

/s/ David Yerushalmi
David Yerushalmi, Esq. (DC Bar No. 978179)
1901 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 201
Washington, D.C. 20001
david.yerushalmi@verizon.net
Tel: (646) 262-0500
Fax: (801) 760-3901

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 20, 2012, a copy of the foregoing and accompanying exhibits were provided to a process server in Washington, D.C. for personal service upon Defendant. Upon actual service, a copy of the affidavit of service will be filed with the court forthwith.

Respectfully submitted,

AMERICAN FREEDOM LAW CENTER

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'R. Muise', written over a horizontal line.

Robert J. Muise, Esq.

EXHIBIT 1

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

AMERICAN FREEDOM DEFENSE
INITIATIVE; PAMELA GELLER; and
ROBERT SPENCER,

Plaintiffs,

-v.-

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA
TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

Defendant.

Case No.

**DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF
PAMELA GELLER**

I, Pamela Geller, make this declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 based on my personal knowledge and upon information and belief where noted:

1. I am an adult citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of New York.
2. Robert Spencer and I co-founded American Freedom Defense Initiative (“AFDI”), which is incorporated under the laws of the State of New Hampshire. I am the Executive Director of AFDI, and Mr. Spencer is the Associate Director. Mr. Spencer and I engage in political speech through AFDI’s activities, including AFDI’s advertising campaign, as described below.
3. AFDI exercises its right to freedom of speech and promotes its objectives through an advertising campaign which involves purchasing advertising space on transit authority property in major cities throughout the United States, including Washington, D.C. AFDI purchases these advertisements to express its message on current events and public issues, particularly including issues involving Islam, sharia, Israel, and the Middle East.

4. Upon information and belief, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) has leased its advertising space for political and social commentary advertisements covering a broad spectrum of political views and ideas.

5. For example, the WMATA has leased its advertising space for a political advertisement that was pro-Palestine and anti-Israel and which displayed the message: “End U.S. military aid to Israel” (hereinafter referred to as “Anti-Israel Advertisement”).

6. Pursuant to the WMATA’s policy of permitting political and social commentary on its advertising space and particularly in light of the fact that the WMATA displayed the Anti-Israel Advertisement, AFDI submitted for approval an advertisement that stated, “In Any War Between the Civilized Man and the Savage, Support the Civilized Man. Support Israel. Defeat Jihad.” (hereinafter referred to as “Pro-Israel Advertisement”). A true and accurate copy of this advertisement is attached to this declaration as Exhibit A.

7. AFDI’s Pro-Israel Advertisement is political speech in direct response to the Anti-Israel Advertisement. The Anti-Israeli Advertisement suggests that Israel’s military is the impediment to peace between the Israelis and Palestinians and that U.S. military aid to Israel also acts as an impediment to peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. In other words, the Anti-Israel Advertisement blames Israel, its military, and U.S. military aid to Israel as the cause of Palestinian terror directed against innocent civilians in Israel and abroad.

8. AFDI’s Pro-Israel Advertisement presents the message that there is no comparison or equivalence between savage civilian-targeting violence and Israel’s civilized struggle for survival in a part of the world where civilized behavior is overshadowed by terrorism and violence, as evidenced by the current world events playing out in Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere.

9. AFDI's Pro-Israel Advertisement is very timely in light of these current events in which Muslims are engaging in violent jihad in response to America's policy toward the Middle East and to allegedly protest speech deemed critical of Islam.

10. AFDI's Pro-Israel Advertisement was approved for display on the WMATA advertising space. The advertisement satisfied all of the WMATA's guidelines for acceptable advertising.

11. Accordingly, on September 6, 2012, AFDI entered into a contract with CBS Outdoor, which acts as the advertising agent for WMATA, to place the Pro-Israel Advertisement on four dioramas. Pursuant to the contract, the "advertising period" for the display was to begin on September 24, 2012 and end on October 21, 2012. A true and correct copy of this contract is attached to this declaration as Exhibit B.

12. Under the contract, the "period cost" for the display of AFDI's Pro-Israel Advertisement was \$5,600, which AFDI promptly paid via credit card on September 10, 2012.

13. In reliance upon this contract, AFDI purchased and printed the advertisements. Consequently, prior to September 18, 2012, the advertisements were ready for display on the WMATA dioramas beginning September 24, 2012, pursuant to the terms of the contract.

14. On September 18, 2012, however, I received an email from Mr. Howard Marcus, the CBS Outdoor agent working on behalf of the WMATA. In this email, Mr. Marcus informed me of the following: "The DC Transit Authority has informed me today that due to the situations happening around the world at this time, we are postponing the start of this program to a future date to be determined."

15. I promptly responded to Mr. Marcus' email the same day, advising him that I wanted to see the WMATA's refusal to run AFDI's advertisement during the contract period

from the WMATA itself. I also made it very clear to Mr. Marcus that he needed to convey to the WMATA the importance of the timing of the advertisement, stating, “It is precisely because of the current political situation that it is important that I be able to express my message now and that I consider any delay to be government censorship of my core political speech.” Consequently, I demanded that the WMATA change its position.

16. Mr. Marcus responded that same day, confirming that the WMATA was not going to change its position, citing “world events and a concern for the security of their passengers” as the basis for “deferring” the display of AFDI’s advertisement. Specifically, Mr. Marcus wrote in his email the following: “The DC Transit Authority has asked me to pass along the below: The advertiser should be assured that Metro is not refusing to run the ad, they are merely deferring it due to world events and a concern for the security of their passengers. The advertiser is welcome to appeal the decision in writing.”

17. AFDI objects to the WMATA’s censorship, which is effectively suppressing the message AFDI is attempting to express based on a perceived negative response to its content and viewpoint by certain viewers. Consequently, AFDI objects to this content- and viewpoint-based restriction on its speech.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 19th day of September 2012.



Pamela Geller

EXHIBIT A

**IN ANY WAR
BETWEEN THE
CIVILIZED MAN
AND THE SAVAGE,
SUPPORT THE
CIVILIZED MAN.**

 **SUPPORT ISRAEL** 
DEFEAT JIHAD

PAID FOR BY THE AMERICAN FREEDOM DEFENSE INITIATIVE

ATLASSHRUGS.COM SIOAONLINE.COM JIHADWATCH.COM

EXHIBIT B

ADVERTISER AGREEMENT



CBS Outdoor
405 Lexington Ave.
New York, NY 10174
(212) 297-6400
(212) 370-1817

CONTRACT NO.: **1271577**

DATE: 09/06/12

ADVERTISER: **American Freedom Defense Initiative/AFDI**

SALESPERSON: Howard Marcus (151)

Client Supplies Production: Yes

Copy must meet Production specifications and be received 10 working days prior to each advertising period.
THIS AGREEMENT AND THE COPY TO BE DISPLAYED HEREUNDER IS SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF CBS OUTDOOR'S MARKET GENERAL MANAGER AND THE OWNER OF THE LOCATION AS APPLICABLE

ADVERTISER

AFDI Initiative
1040 1st Ave.
Room 121
New York, NY 10022
516-426-7630
Attn: Pamela Geller

Subject to the terms of the Production Information Addendum Page and the CBS Outdoor Terms and Conditions of Advertising Service each attached hereto and made a part hereof, "ADVERTISER/AGENCY" hereby contracts with CBS Outdoor ("Company") for the display of advertising Copy ("Copy") on the outdoor advertising display(s) described below, commencing approximately on the commencement date of the Advertising Period listed below. Advertiser/Agency shall provide the Copy in the form and type specified by Company.
See Production Information Addendum page for shipping quantities and addresses.

Market	Media/Location(s)	Size	GRP/EOI 18+	Units	Advertising Period	No. of Periods	*	Period Cost
Washington, DC	Dioramas/Rail Dioramas	43"H X 62"W	SPECIAL	4	09/24/12-10/21/12	1.00	4W	\$5,600.00


Special Instructions:
PRE-PAYMENT REQUIRED

Net Agreement Total: \$5,600.00

THIS AGREEMENT IS NON-CANCELABLE BY ADVERTISER/AGENCY EXCEPT AS SET FORTH IN THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS ATTACHED HERETO WITH RESPECT TO TRANSIT DISPLAYS ONLY. THIS AGREEMENT CONSISTS OF THIS PAGE, THE PRODUCTION INFORMATION ADDENDUM PAGE, AND THE CBS OUTDOOR TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF ADVERTISING SERVICE INCORPORATED HEREIN, ALL OF WHICH ADVERTISER/AGENCY HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIVING AND APPROVING. ANY MISSING PAGES OF THIS AGREEMENT MAY BE OBTAINED OR REQUESTED THROUGH ANY CBS OUTDOOR OFFICE OR REPRESENTATIVE IF LOST OR NOT RECEIVED BY ADVERTISER/AGENCY. FACSIMILE SIGNATURES SHALL HAVE THE SAME FORCE AND EFFECT AS ORIGINAL SIGNATURES. THIS AGREEMENT MAY BE EXECUTED IN SEVERAL COUNTERPARTS, EACH OF WHICH SHALL CONSTITUTE ONE AND THE SAME COPY. AGENCY AND/OR THE SIGNATORY HERETO REPRESENTS AND WARRANTS THAT THEY ARE AUTHORIZED TO EXECUTE THE SAME ON BEHALF OF AND BIND THE ADVERTISER AND THAT THE ADVERTISER APPROVES SAME.

ACCEPTED AND AGREED TO BY - CBS OUTDOOR

ADVERTISER/AGENCY


AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE - TITLE CEO, AFDI

BY _____ DATE _____

PLEASE PRINT ROBERT SPENCER CEO, AFDI DATE 9/6/12

NAME - TITLE

* Period Codes: M=Monthly; W=Weekly; 4W=4 Weeks; D=Daily; OT=One Time TF=Till Forbid

ADVERTISER AGREEMENT - PRODUCTION INFORMATION ADDENDUM



ADVERTISER
AFDI Initiative
1040 1st Ave.
Room 121
New York, NY 10022
516-426-7630
Attn: Pamela Geller

CONTRACT NO.: 1271577

DATE: 09/06/12

ADVERTISER: American Freedom Defense Initiative/AFDI

SALESPERSON: Howard Marcus (151)

Copy must meet Production specifications and be received 10 working days prior to each advertising period.

THIS AGREEMENT AND THE COPY TO BE DISPLAYED HEREUNDER IS SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF CBS OUTDOOR'S MARKET GENERAL MANAGER AND THE OWNER OF THE LOCATION AS APPLICABLE

Market	Media/Location(s)	Size	Copy Due Date	Shipping Quantity	Shipping Address	Service AE	Ext. Fab Per Sq Ft
Washington, DC	Dioramas/Rail Dioramas	43"H X 62"W	09/10/12	8	CBS Outdoor/J.Perez Assoc. Inc 9248 Hampton Overlook Capital Heights, MD 20743 301-324-0284 Attn: Dez Larkin		

1. As used in this herein, Company shall mean CBS Outdoor and Advertiser shall mean and be deemed to include, in addition to Advertiser, any advertising agency or any other agent or licensee of Advertiser (collectively "Advertiser").
2. At least ten (10) working days before the estimated start date, Advertiser, at its sole expense, shall furnish and deliver to Company or to service points designated by Company, sufficient supply of advertising copy, in form and type specified by Company along with written notice to Company setting forth required posting instructions. If copy is not so received, a loss of service may occur or additional costs may be charged by Company although commercially reasonable efforts will be used to post copy as promptly as practicable after receipt from Advertiser. If Advertiser requests expedited installation within five working days of receipt of late received copy, a fee of not less than \$650 per location will be payable. In any event, if copy is not received in a timely manner, Company may use subject locations in any manner, without limiting Advertiser's liability to pay for such space prior to posting the late received copy. If Copy is furnished and delivered as required above and such Copy is not rejected by Company pursuant to the terms hereof (i) the Copy shall be posted, and (ii) in the case of showing based programs the Copy shall be Significantly Posted (as hereinafter defined) by Company within five (5) working days of the date for the commencement of the Advertising Period set forth on the first page of this Agreement. For the purposes hereof, a program shall be deemed to be Significantly Posted if at least 85% of the program has been posted. Nudity, pornographic, profane or obscene copy shall not be permitted. The character, design, text and illustrations on advertising copy and the material used shall be subject to approval by Company and by location owner, transit company/authority or third party controlling location ("Owner"). If copy is rejected, Advertiser shall continue to be liable for the full term of this Contract and Advertiser shall be responsible for providing an acceptable replacement copy within ten days of notification that a previous copy was rejected. If production is received after the date specified by Company, Company shall be entitled to full payment for the contract period even if partial or no display results. Advertiser shall indemnify, defend and save harmless Company and Owner against all claims and liabilities arising out of the advertising material displayed under this Contract, including but not limited to any claim for defamation, or infringement of any copyright, trademark, or other intellectual property or privacy right and reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in defending any such claims.
3. Should Advertiser's copy be damaged, defaced, or deteriorated for any reason whatsoever, including ordinary wear and tear, or if lost or stolen, Advertiser shall furnish a replacement copy, upon Company's request, without liability or expense to Company. If Advertiser fails to provide such replacement copy, Company may use the location involved in any manner, without releasing Advertiser from obligation to pay for such location. Unless otherwise specified on the face hereof, there will be a service charge for all installations on walls and for any changes in any display material after initial placement. All designs for displays produced by Company will be faithfully reproduced. Company will maintain displays in good condition to the extent of matters reasonably within Company's control or assumed responsibilities. Any repainting or reposting requested by Advertiser in addition to that specified herein, if any, shall be paid by Advertiser in advance per Company's current quoted prices.
4. If for any reason whatsoever during the term hereof (i) Company is unable to secure any specified location or loses the right to use any location, or (ii) any location becomes obstructed, destroyed or defaced, or (iii) Company fails to timely meet its posting requirements hereunder, any resulting loss of advertising shall not be deemed a breach or termination of this Contract. Company shall have the option to replace lost locations with locations of equal value per Company's prices and/or classifications, or to issue a pro-rated credit. Any delay in commencing of service and/or posting of fewer locations than specified and/or resulting loss of advertising service caused by any reason whatsoever, shall not render Company liable for any damages or offsets of any kind and shall be remedied solely by extending the Advertising Period of this Contract to provide an equivalent amount of advertising service at the contracted location or a replacement location of equal value, or at Company's option, result in a pro-rated credit, with all other remedies at law or equity being expressly waived by Advertiser. Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, if any location is lost for any reason whatsoever, Company shall also have the option to terminate this Contract and receive payment in full for services through the termination date.
5. Where illuminated displays are provided, illumination will be from dusk to midnight. If illumination is halted or reduced for any reason, including but not limited to operation of law or malfunction of equipment, Advertiser shall receive a credit for the period of reduced or non-illumination at the rate of fifteen percent (15%) of the contract price for the impacted period, provided Advertiser shall have first given written notice to Company of the illumination problem and same continues for more than five (5) days after Company's receipt of such notice.
6. Advertiser shall inspect the display within three (3) days after installation. Unless within such period Advertiser gives written notice to Company specifying any defect, the display shall be conclusively presumed to have been inspected and approved by Advertiser for all purposes whatsoever, including content and location of displays. If after installation of display Owner disapproves any advertisement, or if adverse publicity results from any display, Company shall have the right to remove advertisement and, at its option, either terminate this Contract or request a new acceptable advertisement copy pursuant to paragraph 2 above. Company and Advertiser accept this Contract subject to all federal, state and municipal laws and regulations. In the event any advertisement becomes illegal, Company reserves the right to terminate same upon notice to Advertiser. Acceptance of this Contract is subject to credit check and approval by Company. Company, in its sole discretion, may extend or reject credit, or at any time during the term, withdraw credit and Company may thereupon require partial or full payment of the remaining contract amount in advance. In the event of any termination under this paragraph, Advertiser's obligation shall cease as of the effective termination date.
7. Agency and Advertiser shall be jointly and severally liable for payment of the amounts owed under this Contract. In the event of default or material breach by Advertiser/Agency, in addition to other remedies available at law, Company may: (a) cancel this Contract without prior notice and demand payments of all amounts remaining due and owing; (b) without terminating this Contract, declare the entire balance of payments to be made hereunder immediately due and payable; (c) remove all of Advertiser's displays without limiting Advertiser's liability hereunder; and/or (d) declare Advertiser in default under any other agreement with Company. Waiver by Company of any breach by Advertiser/Agency hereunder shall not prejudice the rights of Company with respect to any breach not specifically waived by Company. In the event of legal action arising out of this Contract, Company shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and out of pocket expenses. This Contract and all related claims shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Arizona and Maricopa County, Arizona shall be the proper and exclusive legal jurisdiction and venue for any resulting legal action.
8. Invoicing will be rendered monthly in advance dating from the commencement date. Invoices rendered to Advertiser shall be conclusive as to the correctness of the items stated unless Company receives written objection within fifteen (15) days thereof. Non-receipt of invoices or lack of invoicing, shall not impact Advertiser's liability hereunder. Any discounts given shall be forfeited/reversed for invoices not paid within sixty (60) days from the date thereof. All rates and adjustments are computed on the basis of thirty (30) days to the month, unless a different period is specified on the face hereof. Invoices shall be due thirty (30) days after the date of invoice and failure to pay within such timeframe shall result in a default hereunder and shall further be deemed a default under any other agreements with Company. Invoices not paid when due shall accrue interest at the rate of one and one-half percent (1.5%) per month (18% annual), or such lesser rate permitted by law.
9. Company shall not be held responsible for unused posters, displays or other copy provided by Advertiser and Company may dispose of any such materials. Company may promote Company's own business through the use of Advertiser's posters or displays in any manner whatsoever. Company is an Equal Opportunity Employer.
10. This Contract contains the full agreement of the parties, and no prior representation or assurance, verbal or written not contained herein, shall affect or alter the obligation of either party hereto. This Contract is not cancelable or assignable by Advertiser, nor may the subject of the advertising be changed without the consent of Company. Notwithstanding the foregoing, agreements for transit displays may be cancelled by Advertiser upon providing at least 90-days written notice prior to affected posting date, with Advertiser paying, upon invoicing, short rate for actual length of term.
11. The following provisions shall be applicable in the event that this Contract shall be for the display of advertising copy on a LED, LCD or other digital display sign ("Digital Sign"): Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the Company shall be not obligated to display the copy for more than 91% of the display time provided hereunder (the "Guaranteed Display Time"). If the Company displays the copy for at least the Guaranteed Display Time, there shall be no reduction in the fee paid hereunder or extension of the term hereof. If the Company displays the copy for less than the Guaranteed Display Time, the Company shall, in its sole discretion, either (i) terminate this Contract and reimburse the Advertiser for fees paid relating to the period for which the copy was not displayed for at least the Guaranteed Display Time, (ii) equitably extend the Advertising Period of this Contract at the contracted location or a replacement location of equal value, or (iii) issue to Advertiser a pro-rated credit for advertising services equivalent to the period for which copy was not displayed for the Guaranteed Display Time. The Advertiser hereby expressly waives all other remedies at law or equity, and the Company shall have no other liability to the Advertiser as a result of any failure to display the copy for at least the Guaranteed Display Time. In addition to the foregoing, the Company shall have the right at any time to preempt the display of copy in order to utilize the Digital Sign(s) for public service messages in connection with (i) an Amber Alert, or (ii) at the request of any Federal, State or local authority, any public emergency (including but not limited to emergencies related to homeland security) (an "Emergency Interruption"). In such event, the Company shall not be in breach of this Contract and the Company shall have no liability to the Advertiser pursuant to the preceding paragraph or otherwise as a result of any such Emergency Interruption. The Advertiser hereby expressly waives any remedies at law or equity to which the Advertiser might otherwise be entitled as a result of such Emergency Interruption. For the purposes of the provisions hereof pertaining to the display of advertising on a Digital Sign, "copy" shall be deemed to mean any advertisement displayed on such sign whether the same is animated, static or otherwise, specifically including, but not limited to, streaming content or digital images, as applicable.
12. Agency/Advertiser hereby represents, warrants and confirms that it is aware of the requirements of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2257-2257A and that it fully complies with them either by certifying to the U.S. Attorney General, in the form required by 28 C.F.R. § 75.9, that Agency/Advertiser collects and maintains individually identifiable information relating to models used in the advertisement to be displayed pursuant to the terms hereof (including but not limited to their names, addresses, and dates of birth) in accordance with applicable Federal and/or State tax and labor or other law, or that Agency/Advertiser creates, maintains, cross-indexes and makes available for inspection records as required by 28 C.F.R. §§ 75.2-75.5. Upon request, Agency/Advertiser will provide Company with proof of its compliance.

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

AMERICAN FREEDOM DEFENSE
INITIATIVE; PAMELA GELLER; and
ROBERT SPENCER,

Plaintiffs,

-v.-

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA
TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

Defendant.

Case No.

**TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER**

Upon the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order / Preliminary Injunction of Plaintiffs American Freedom Defense Initiative, Pamela Geller, and Robert Spencer and for good cause shown, Plaintiffs' motion is hereby Granted.

The court finds that Plaintiffs have established: (1) a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of their First Amendment claim; (2) that they will suffer irreparable harm if the TRO is not granted; (3) that other interested parties will not suffer substantial harm if the TRO is granted; and (4) that the public interest would be furthered by the TRO.

Specific facts set forth in Plaintiffs' supporting documents establish that Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights will be violated if their political advertisement is not displayed on Monday, September 24, 2012 pursuant to the terms of the Advertiser Agreement entered into between CBS Outdoor, the advertising agency acting on behalf of Defendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA"), and Plaintiffs. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held, "The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). Consequently, the

court finds that notice was not required pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b) and therefore sets a hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction for _____.

Pursuant to this Order, the WMATA is hereby ordered to display Plaintiffs' advertisement pursuant to the terms of the Advertiser Agreement beginning on Monday, September 24, 2012. This Order is effective immediately and will expire within 14 days of today's date, at which time the court will consider whether it is appropriate to enter a preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiffs to cover the duration of the agreed upon advertising period (September 24, 2012 to October 21, 2012).

This Order is hereby entered at _____ on _____ September, 2012.

United States District Court Judge