



APTA-SS-SEM-RP-015-19

First Published: November 7, 2019

APTA Security Emergency Management
Working Group

Suspension of Service of a Public Transportation System and Recovery

Abstract: This standard identifies strategies for transit agencies in the event of a potential suspension of service of the transit system and its recovery. For the purposes of this standard, a full or partial suspension of service could be implemented due to security or safety concerns such as an act of terrorism, an imminent security threat, a major safety hazard, extreme weather, natural disasters or other conditions identified by the agency.

Keywords: all hazards, emergency operations center (EOC), evacuation, National Incident Management System (NIMS), operations control center (OCC), security, sensitive security information (SSI), system suspension of service, tabletop exercise (TTX), unified command, transit agency

Summary: This *Recommended Practice* identifies the challenges that may arise from all hazards, natural or human-made, that require a full or partial suspension of service of the system, and the actions that can be taken by various levels of transit agency employees to mitigate the potential hazards and impacts of such a suspension of service. It provides guidance in preparing for the challenges of managing the passengers, employees, facilities and fleet during such an event with or without advance notification.

Scope and purpose: This standard identifies options when an incident necessitates some form of transit service disruption. The specific detailed criteria for an agency to decide when to suspend service are not addressed in detail in this document, since that may be sensitive security information. The emphasis is directed at the actions that need to be taken to safely and efficiently suspend service on a portion or entire transit system. A minor suspension of service involving a train station or bus stop is not within the scope of this standard, since it is a routine operation for most if not all transit agencies.

This security recommended practice represents a common viewpoint of those parties concerned with its provisions, namely transit operating/planning agencies, manufacturers, consultants, engineers and general interest groups. The application of any recommended practices or guidelines contained herein is voluntary. In some cases, federal and/or state regulations govern portions of a transit system's operations. In those cases, the government regulations take precedence over this standard. APTA recognizes that for certain applications, the standards or practices as implemented by individual transit agencies may be either more or less restrictive than those given in this document, unless referenced in federal regulations.

© 2019 The North American Transportation Services Association (NATSA) and its parent organization APTA. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, in an electronic retrieval system or otherwise, without prior written permission of NATSA.

Table of Contents

Participants.....	iii
Introduction.....	iii
1. What is a suspension of service?	1
1.1 Definition	1
1.2 Reason for a suspension of service	1
1.3 Considerations for a suspension of service	1
2. Decision for suspension of services	2
2.1 Internal decision.....	3
2.2 External decision.....	4
3. Characteristics of system suspension of services	4
3.1 Planned vs. unplanned	4
3.2 Partial vs. full system.....	5
3.3 Modal vs. multimodal	5
3.4 Facilities suspension of service.....	5
3.5 Single or multifacility suspension of service	5
3.6 Short term vs. long term.....	5
4. Internal coordination	5
4.1 Management of employees	5
4.2 Management of passengers	6
4.3 Initial field response to a major incident.....	7
4.4 Management of vehicles	7
4.5 Management of facilities.....	7
4.6 Roles and responsibilities.....	8
4.7 EOC activation.....	9
5. External coordination	9
5.1 Coordinating with other agencies	9
5.2 Communications and public affairs concerns	9
6. Authority to reopen.....	10
7. System recovery	10
8. Training and exercises	10
Related APTA standards.....	11
Definitions.....	11
Abbreviations and acronyms.....	11
Summary of document changes	12
Document history.....	12

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1 Example Decision Flow Chart.....	4
--	---



Participants

The American Public Transportation Association greatly appreciates the contributions of the **APTA Security Emergency Management Working Group**, which provided the primary effort in the drafting of this document.

At the time this standard was completed, the working group included the following members:

Thomas Eng, *LACMTA, Chair*

Sam Caron, *Minneapolis Metro Transit, Co-Chair*

Christy Bailly, *Minneapolis Metro Transit*

Neil Crosier, *Kansas City Metro Transit*

Rufus Francis, *Sacramento Regional Transit*

Devan Gourdine, *Chicago Transit Authority*

Paul Harvey, *VIA Metropolitan Transit*

Ann Hutcheson, *ECCTA*

Mark Johnson, *Lane Transit District*

Robert Melan, *TSA*

John Plante, *Metra*

Alexa Dupigny-Samuels, *WMATA*

Jill Shaw, *Dallas Area Rapid Transit*

Tony Tisdale, *Federal Transit Administration*

Alexander Ubiadas, *TriMet*

Introduction

This introduction is not part of APTA SS-SEM-RP-015-19, "Suspension of Service of a Public Transportation System and Recovery."

APTA recommends the use of this document by:

- individuals or organizations that operate rail transit systems;
- individuals or organizations that contract with others for the operation of rail transit systems; and
- individuals or organizations that influence how rail transit systems are operated (including but not limited to consultants, designers and contractors).

Suspension of Service of a Public Transportation System and Recovery

1. What is a suspension of service?

1.1 Definition

For the purpose of this document, a suspension of service is a major event leading to evacuation of employees and passengers on some if not all of the transit system for an extended period of time.

Examples of suspension of services:

- single or multiline suspension of service
- multiple station suspension of service
- modal suspension of service
- multimodal suspension of service
- multi-facility suspension of service

Events that may cause a suspension of service include but are not limited to acts of terrorism, extreme weather, major earthquakes, civil unrest, significant credible security threats and labor strikes.

1.2 Reason for a suspension of service

A suspension of service is a measure that transit agencies may implement under extreme conditions. While there may be different reasons to initiate a suspension of service, first and foremost should be the safety and security of transit passengers and employees. In case of an emergency situation due to circumstances stemming from all hazards, whether originating from natural, weather-related causes (floods, earthquakes, etc.) or because of human acts such as terrorism and threats, a transit agency should be prepared to handle the unexpected challenges.

1.3 Considerations for a suspension of service

The continuation of service and a suspension of service each have pros and cons. In general, a useful guideline for determining the need for a suspension of service is whether the most good will be done for the most number of people. The primary benefit of continuing transit service during an emergency is to get people where they need to go. Major inconveniences such as business interruptions, traffic, impacted employee work schedules, missed medical visits, crowd control, etc. can be avoided by continuing transit service.

On the other hand, safety and security of the riding public are high priorities. In light of a credible and imminent threat or an unfolding event, the transit agency and its partners should consider whether the safety and security of the riding public is better served with a suspension of service. Such partners may include local, state or national agencies that share an interest in the decision. Local partners will especially need to be involved, since a suspension of service will cause traffic issues for the local area. This may end up being a local decision, so the decision process should be identified in advance when possible.

Suspension of Service of a Public Transportation System and Recovery

A challenge in determining the need for a suspension of service prior to an event is the real-time assessment and validation of the threat or unfolding incident. For example, security threats must be evaluated in light of the potential for harm, threat credibility and inconvenience to the riding public and region if a suspension of service were to be ordered.

Taking a too conservative approach, such as shutting down the system when it turns out to be unnecessary, will have undesirable consequences, such as eroding the public’s confidence in the system and loss of ridership. Conversely, taking a more risky posture of continuing transit service when a security threat or public safety is developing could potentially result in harm to the riding public and transit agency employees.

2. Decision for suspension of services

The request to suspend service may come as part of the transit agency’s internal activation procedures; from an outside agency such as a governor’s executive order, fire department, law enforcement or public health; or in coordination with several agencies, such as a unified command or an emergency operations center (EOC). Who decides that a suspension of service is needed, and how that decision is made, are decision processes that are beneficially discussed and decided before an event occurs. Such pre-planning may mitigate last-minute uncertainty or confusion on how the suspension of service is implemented. Some of the basic questions that a transit agency needs to address in its planning:

- What types of incidents or threats warrant a suspension of service?
- Who has authority to order a suspension of service?
- What process should be followed when ordering a suspension of service?
- Should one or more lines suspend service, and should it be multimodal (where applicable)?
- How should local, domestic and international security incidents influence a decision to suspend service, if at all?
- What types of incidents/events are more meaningful than others? Transit? Non-transit? Local? National?
- How long would it realistically take to identify an event as an act of terrorism and to react?
- How does the agency manage its employees and passengers during a suspension of service?

The following are some examples of how such a suspension of service may be initiated:

- Local law enforcement or transit police order a suspension of service of the transit system due to an act of terrorism or imminent and credible terrorism threat.
- Public health authorities request a suspension of service of the transit system due to the outbreak of a pandemic.
- The transit agency general manager or designee orders a suspension of service due to extreme weather or natural events such as an approaching hurricane, flooding, a snowstorm or a damaging earthquake.
- The general manager or designee, in coordination with local authorities, orders a suspension of service due to civil unrest.
- Agencies funded by the FTA may be subject to operating restrictions during a national emergency.

An order to suspend service that originates within the TA may occur in any of a number of ways. One way of accomplishing this activity could be as follows:

- The transit agency’s own transit police, contracted law enforcement agency or local law enforcement agency assesses threat or actual incident conditions and in coordination with the transit operations management decides to order a partial or complete suspension of service.

Suspension of Service of a Public Transportation System and Recovery

- Transit agency staff acts as an active participant in the discussions and on an equal footing with the law enforcement agency or transit police.
- A unified command structure is established for the purpose of managing the event.
- Notification is made to the local media via the transit agency’s PIO to inform the public.
- The agency’s operations control staff directs the bus and/or rail vehicle operators to stop service and to evacuate to a safe location.
- The agency’s operations control and/or vehicle maintenance staff identifies how to secure the fleet during a suspension of service.
- Other employees working at affected transit facilities, such as custodians, station agents and maintenance-of-way employees, are informed to evacuate to a safe location.
- Timely notifications are made to executive management, local stakeholders and PIOs on status of suspension of service.
- Employees who have been directed to evacuate their work locations or transit vehicles communicate with their supervisors for further directions and information.
- Once the incident or threat has been mitigated, and the proper authority such as local law enforcement or transit police, in coordination with the transit agency, determines that it is safe to resume transit service, the agency verifies the readiness of the system to resume service.
- An orderly inspection of evacuated transit facilities, equipment and vehicles is performed by the transit agency.
- A phased resumption of service is likely as vehicles, equipment and facilities are cleared for service.
- The agency’s PIO informs the local media of the resumption of service.


An order to suspend service from an external agency, other than law enforcement, that has authority to do so may follow in a similar path. For example, a security directive or order from a health director to suspend service may lack the involved coordinated local assessments and discussions that occur with an internal decision, but will generally follow a similar path once the decision has been made. It should be noted that such an occurrence is rare and would be exercised only under extreme conditions, such as those affecting national security or public health.

2.1 Internal decision

The decision process and authority within a transit agency to suspend service should be identified in advance of an incident. This will mitigate last-minute efforts to determine who has the authority, under what conditions it should be exercised, and how it should be conducted. The process should be documented and understood by key staff who will have a role in the suspension of service. This process may be treated as SSI based upon the level of confidentiality needed to protect such information. The level of detail on when to suspend service may vary among transit agencies, but each transit agency should, as a minimum, provide some basic direction to guide staff. The agency can conduct a tabletop exercise (TTX) to train staff and to identify potential improvements to the suspension-of-service process.

Figure 1 shows, in descending order, an example of how a transit agency may come to the decision to suspend service. This list is not intended to be all-inclusive, and transit agencies are strongly encouraged to develop their own decision process that will best suit their own needs. For example, the agency CEO or general manager may unilaterally make the decision to suspend service, after consulting with the transit police, local law enforcement and/or the transit operational staff.

FIGURE 1
Example Decision Flow Chart



2.2 External decision

The decision to suspend service may originate from outside the transit agency. An external order to suspend service would occur only in an extreme and unusual circumstance. Nevertheless, the transit agency should always be prepared to proactively involve itself via its senior management in order to ensure involvement in any major decisions impacting the agency, especially when such decisions have the potential to impact the safety and security of its employees, passengers and emergency responders with potential life-or-death consequences. The transit agency should identify what agencies may have the authority to either recommend or require a suspension of service in order to prepare for such an event. Once these agencies are identified, training exercises with them should be considered to prepare for such an event.

3. Characteristics of system suspension of services

3.1 Planned vs. unplanned

Planned suspension of services provide the transit agency more time to prepare for the event. Such preparations may include protection of equipment, rolling stock and facilities, and notification to the riding public about the service disruption. Labor strikes are an example of situations when the transit agency has some advance notification.

APTA SS-SEM-RP-015-19
Suspension of Service of a Public Transportation System and Recovery

Unplanned suspension of services by definition provide the transit agency with little or no time to prepare. Such events may occur for several reasons, including an act of terrorism or a regional power failure or unexpected natural disaster.

For both types of suspension of services, the transit agency can plan ahead in anticipation of the likely events by first identifying them in threat and vulnerability analyses or all-hazard assessments.

3.2 Partial vs. full system

Partial suspension of services affect only part of the transit system, such as a rail line or bus route, while transit service continues to operate elsewhere. Full system suspension of services involve the entire transit system and pose more challenges in terms of employee and passenger handling.

3.3 Modal vs. multimodal

Modal suspension of services affect only one mode, such as bus services, paratransit services or rail systems. This may occur when the event or threat applies to one mode only. A multimodal suspension of service involves more than one mode being involved, by definition, and will have significant impacts to the service area in addition to passenger and employee management issues.

3.4 Facilities suspension of service

It may be necessary to shut down transit facilities such as administrative offices, vehicle storage yards and associated vehicle maintenance and maintenance-of-way buildings, bus transit centers or turnarounds, passenger platforms, park-and-rides, etc. The decision for such closure should be based upon an assessment of the emergency or credible imminent threat and be commensurate with such a threat.

3.5 Single or multifacility suspension of service

A suspension of service may include one or more TA facilities, such as a bus transit center, central control, rail maintenance yard, etc. Multifacility suspensions of service will have a greater impact than a single-facility suspension of service and will involve more coordination to manage the safety and security of the facilities and the employees. Service continuation (if decided to operate) during such a suspension of service will also need to be coordinated.

3.6 Short term vs. long term

Length of suspensions of service may vary, based on the situation. Both types involve similar issues, such as passenger and employee communication and safety.

4. Internal coordination

4.1 Management of employees

During a suspension of service, the primary concern is notification to the affected employees. The objective is to safely clear all employees from the facility. Proper notification should be made by the transit agency so that employees are instructed on expected actions to take, both during and after the evacuation or suspension of service.

Transit agencies should establish guidance and/or standard operating procedures on how to notify employees and to instruct them on recommended actions during an evacuation or suspension of service.

APTA SS-SEM-RP-015-19
Suspension of Service of a Public Transportation System and Recovery

Some considerations to address in employee management:

- identification of employees to be evacuated
- means of notification (radio, telephone, public address announcements, etc.)
- transportation
- lodging
- emergency supplies
- instructions

Information on employees' roles and responsibilities in an emergency should be outlined and made available for employees to understand, such as in an agency's emergency operations plan (EOP) and/or standard operating procedures. Some of the information to place in the EOP may include but is not limited to the following:

- instructions for sheltering in place or evacuation
- location of emergency supplies
- evacuation routes and alternative gathering locations
- alternate reporting locations after event/emergency
- emergency contact numbers
- identification of emergency response teams
- AED and first aid stations

For further information, transit agencies may refer to <https://www.transit.dot.gov/regulations-and-guidance/safety/emergency-management> for a self-help reference to assist in employee training. See also APTA SS-SEM-RP-001-08, "Creating a Continuity of Operations Plan."

4.2 Management of passengers

Some types of suspensions of service provide more opportunity for the transit agency to manage passengers, especially when there is more time to plan for the event or when the suspension of service is relatively short in duration. Management of bus passengers may be as simple as having the bus operator off-load the passengers to a safe location and stand by with them while the event unfolds. Similarly, rail passengers may be off-loaded at a station and evacuated to a safe location.

The management of passengers, including passengers with special needs, is an integral part of an agency's EOP and standard operating procedures.

Some of the information the EOP or standard operating procedures should address includes the following:

- roles and responsibilities of management and employees (see Section 4.6 for more information on specific roles of employees)
- role of station agents, bus and rail operators during suspension of service
- role of other operations employees to assist where needed
- role of unified command in managing incident
- notification and update to passengers regarding alternate transportation if available
- notification to local jurisdictions that a suspension of service will take place
- external communications with the media and websites
- resources recommended by the U.S. Access Board (<http://www.access-board.gov/>) for general reference/guidance for transit agencies in the overall development of their EOPs or standard operating procedures regarding transit facilities and transit vehicles

4.3 Initial field response to a major incident

In the case of an event such as a natural disaster or an act of terrorism, immediate assistance by first responders may not be readily available. First responders may be preoccupied for some time with vital life rescue activities at multiple locations, and in some cases transit agencies may be left to attend to large crowds of evacuated passengers for some period of time. This situation could be complicated further if there is massive infrastructure damage to surrounding buildings, roads and highways. On-scene employees using the Incident Command System (ICS) should take the following actions if confronted with this type of event:

- Establish and maintain communications with the transit agency’s operations control center (OCC) or EOC if one is established. Report on-scene conditions, request assistance as needed, and gather relevant information on expected help and assistance for patrons under their supervision.
- Keep patrons informed regarding expected assistance, recommended courses of action (shelter in place or otherwise) and options available. Agency personnel should not insist that patrons take certain actions, but they should demonstrate leadership by sharing information, providing sound advice and exercising good judgment.
- Identify people with special needs, and convey imminent needs back to the OCC or EOC for action.
- When assistance from response agencies arrives, transfer command and brief the new incident commander on pertinent conditions, and remain as the transit agency’s liaison until relieved by higher transit agency authority.

4.4 Management of vehicles

Management of vehicles is an important concern for the transit agency during any suspension of service, since the vehicles’ security may be compromised if they cannot be returned to their storage facility. Depending on the situation, it may be possible to plan ahead for when and how to securely store the fleet before conditions jeopardize the safety and security of employees. When there is little advance notice of an emergency or disaster, it may not be possible to return the fleet to the storage yard. In this case, vehicles may need to be left in place, such as on the mainline for rail vehicles or on streets for buses.

Refer to the APTA *Recommended Practice* “Shelter of Transit Vehicles and Nonrevenue Equipment During Emergencies” for more information.

4.5 Management of facilities

Management of facilities is closely tied to the management of employees and passengers during a suspension of service. If a decision is made to evacuate facilities, then transit agency employees and/or transit police or local law enforcement will likely be needed to assist. Once cleared of passengers or employees, facilities may need to be secured to keep out unauthorized people in locations such as subway stations, transit centers, park-and-rides and tunnels. On-street bus stops and at-grade rail stations typically do not warrant special security due to their open and accessible nature, unless a threat and vulnerability assessment (TVA) or hazard analysis indicates otherwise.

Some aspects of management of facilities that need to be addressed include the following:

- evacuation of passengers and employees, including those with special needs
- continuation of security and safety monitoring systems
- closure and lockdown
- security
- readiness inspections before reopening

4.6 Roles and responsibilities

In any suspension of service, multiple transit agency departments will be involved to help make the transition an orderly and safe one. The transit agency should develop, communicate and drill on a plan addressing the roles and responsibilities of employees. While not intended to be all-inclusive, the following departments and outside agencies may have a role in a suspension of service:

- **Operations control center (OCC):** The OCC has the responsibility to direct the suspension of transit service. This includes communications with all affected operators, station agents, wayside and facilities employees, field and road supervisors, etc. The OCC directs operators on actions to take with regard to their transit vehicles. The OCC also communicates with third-party agencies such as fire and law enforcement as needed.
- **Transit agency departments:** Several transit agency departments may be involved in a suspension of service. At a minimum, vehicle operators, road and field supervisors, station agents, wayside and facility staff, and public affairs/media will assist in suspending transit service, evacuating passengers and employees, coordinating with news media, etc.
- **Transit agency vehicle operators:** Operators need to be instructed on communicating a suspension of service to their passengers, safely evacuating them to a safe location, providing instructions, and giving updates on the status of service.
- **Station agents:** Station agents should be trained or instructed how to communicate a suspension of service to their passengers in the station, evacuating them to a safe location, providing instructions, and giving updates on the status of service.
- **Field or road supervisors:** Supervisors should be trained or instructed how to assist bus or rail vehicle operators to stop service and evacuate their passengers, and how to interact with first responders as needed.
- **Wayside and facilities staff:** These employees may be needed to assist in facility or system inspections to identify security threats.
- **Law enforcement/transit police:** Local law enforcement or the transit police (as applicable) will assist in the orderly suspension of service. Security sweeps may be necessary, along with a lockdown of the facilities. If a unified command structure is established, then law enforcement will be included.
- **Fire:** Fire departments will be needed in order to respond to incidents in which injuries and fatalities occur, or to be on standby in preparation for a potential event. They will be included in the unified command structure.
- **Public health:** The governor or health officer responsible for the transit service area has the authority to request a suspension of transit services when public health issues become extreme. For example, if a pandemic were to result in a significant percentage of society being sick, the governor or health officer could order transit services to be suspended in order to help contain the spreading illness (such as an influenza).
- **EOC:** The state, city or county and the transit agency emergency operations centers would typically be activated for significant events such as an act of terrorism or an impending weather-related threat such as a hurricane or tornado. The role of the EOC is to monitor events as they unfold, to communicate status to decision makers, and to respond to requests for resources from the field, among other functions. It is common for the TA to assign a representative to the state, city or county EOC when transit may be involved to help coordinate the response.
- **Unified and/or area command:** Unified and/or area command serves as the multiagency management structure that determines tactical decisions during the management of an incident or disaster. Typical components include law enforcement, fire, medical and liaison officers such as transit.

4.7 EOC activation

Transit agency EOC activation will likely occur whenever there is a suspension of service. There should be general guidelines issued by the transit agency on criteria to activate the EOC. If the EOC is in a facility that is evacuated, then an alternate site should be available where transit agency staff can monitor the event. See APTA SEM-SS-RP-007-09, “Creating an Alternate or Backup Operations Control Center.”

5. External coordination

Keeping outside agencies and the public informed as much as possible will assist the transit agency in functioning more efficiently during an emergency. This section contains recommendations for implementing a successful external communication protocol.

5.1 Coordinating with other agencies

The more widespread the transit system suspension of service is, the more external coordination will be required. Several agencies will need to be contacted. These agencies will have a role in the management of the incident. Each transit agency may have its own unique agency notifications and should exercise diligence in determining the appropriate agency contacts. For some agencies, it may be necessary to activate MOUs to receive the needed support from other agencies. See APTA SS-SEM-RP-011-09, “Regional Emergency Planning and Participation in Mutual Aid.” The following agencies may need to be notified:

- local government entities such as state, city and/or county
- police
- fire
- transit agency and local government EOC
- local transit agencies
- emergency medical services (EMS)
- traffic/transportation department
- local media

5.2 Communications and public affairs concerns

The transit agency’s PIO or other transit agency employee should be well-trained in how to contact the local media, other transit agencies, state and city/county agencies/departments, federal agencies such as the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC), the FTA, and the NTSB (when applicable). A PIO should use the ICS protocols when communicating information to passengers and employees with informative updates and/or instructions. When multiple PIOs exist from different agencies, coordination shall be made to communicate the same message to the public, usually through the Joint Information center (JIC).

The following resources are available to contact federal agencies in case of a system suspension of service:

- **Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC):** The TSOC serves as the 24/7 point of contact for all hazards that cause or that have the potential to cause significant disruptions in service at any transit agency in the country on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Contact TSOC.ST@dhs.gov or 866-615-5150.
- **FTA regional offices:** One of the primary functions of the FTA regional offices is to work with local transit officials in developing and processing grant applications. Another key role entails maintaining a 24/7 vigil for all hazards that cause or that have the potential to cause significant disruptions in service at any of the transit agencies/grantees under its purview, as well as to receive notifications from grantees regarding same on behalf of the U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary. Accordingly, each region has an emergency coordinator (EC) and at least one alternate who serve as primary information/communications conduits between the transit agencies in their

APTA SS-SEM-RP-015-19
Suspension of Service of a Public Transportation System and Recovery

regions and FTA headquarters. If not already known, all transit agencies are requested to contact the FTA regional office in their area in order to determine the identity and contact information for their regional EC and alternate in order to make such notifications. These offices can be reached via the website <https://www.transit.dot.gov/about/regional-offices/regional-offices>.

6. Authority to reopen

Once the threat or hazard that caused the need for a suspension of service has been mitigated or no longer exists, the transit agency's focus on reopening the system will be paramount. The transit agency should have documented guidance on identifying who has authority to reopen the system, or at least identify the process to decide on a reopening. This may vary depending on the cause of the suspension of service. The decision for reopening rests internally with the transit agency, in the absence of health or safety concerns, and may include input from the appropriate outside agencies. For hazardous-materials related incidents such as a chemical or biological release, other federal agencies may be involved in authorizing reoccupancy of the facilities, such as the EPA.

7. System recovery

System recovery refers to those activities that need to be completed in order to restore the system to normal operations. It may be phased over several hours, days or longer depending on the nature and cause of the suspension of service. The following are some of the noteworthy activities that should be completed by the transit agency before resuming service:

- systems, rolling stock, facilities and right-of way-inspections and verification of operability and safety
- availability and transportation of employees to worksites
- refueling of buses
- notification to public via news media, social messaging and websites

8. Training and exercises

Even though a suspension of service may be infrequent, there is still a need to address the training of the various employees involved in responding and recovering from an emergency. Discussion-based and operation-based exercises are available for employee training.

- written plans
- tabletop exercises (TTXs)
- drills
- functional exercise
- full-scale exercise

For more information on the available types of training exercises available, refer to APTA SS-SEM-S-004-09, "General Guidance on Transit Incident Drills and Exercises."

Related APTA standards

APTA-SS-SEM-RP-001-08, “Creating a Continuity of Operations Plan”

APTA SS-SEM-S-006-09, “Shelter of Transit Vehicles and Nonrevenue Equipment During Emergencies”

APTA SS-SEM-S-004-09, “General Guidance on Transit Incident Drills and Exercises”

APTA SS-SEM-RP-011-09, “Regional Emergency Planning and Participation in Mutual Aid”

APTA SEM-SS-RP-007-09, “Creating an Alternate or Backup Operations Control Center”

Definitions

all hazards: Any natural or human-caused phenomenon that impacts the operations of a transit agency and/or its employees, ridership, first responders, etc.

drill: A coordinated, supervised activity usually employed to test a specific operation or function in a single agency. Drills are commonly used to provide training on new equipment, to develop or test new policies or procedures, or to practice and maintain current skills.

emergency operations center (EOC): The transit agency’s or local jurisdiction’s location where management of an emergency situation is conducted.

Incident Command System (ICS): A standardized management tool for meeting the demands of small or large emergency or nonemergency situations. ICS represents “best practices” and has become the standard for emergency management across the country and is a key feature of the National Incident Management System. For more information, refer to <https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/assets/reviewmaterials.pdf>.

Sensitive Security Information (SSI): Information that requires special handling due to its sensitive nature.

tabletop exercise (TTX): A discussion-based exercise held in a conference room setting that is intended to address a stated objective.

unified command: An organizational structure established along National Incident Management System concepts to manage an incident or event.

Abbreviations and acronyms

AED	automatic external defibrillator
EC	emergency coordinator
EOC	emergency operations center
EOP	emergency operations plan
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
FTA	Federal Transit Administration
JIC	Joint Information Center
MOU	memorandum of understanding
NATSA	North American Transportation Services Association
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NTSB	National Transportation Safety Board
OCC	operations control center
PIO	public information officer

APTA SS-SEM-RP-015-19
Suspension of Service of a Public Transportation System and Recovery

SSI Sensitive Security Information
TSOC transportation security operations center
TTX tabletop exercise
TVA threat and vulnerability assessment

Summary of document changes

- None

Document history

Document Version	Working Group Vote	Public Comment/ Technical Oversight	CEO Approval	Policy & Planning Approval	Publish Date
First published	Jan 30, 2019	Mar. 1, 2019	Jul. 10, 2019	Oct. 20, 2019	Nov. 7, 2019
First revision	—	—	—	—	—
Second revision	—	—	—	—	—