TSA Surface Cybersecurity Resources

Lee Allen

DHS/TSA/Office of Security Policy & Industry Engagement/Surface Division, Cybersecurity Lead Arlington, VA





Key Presentation Take-Aways

- Cyber Critical Infrastructure Protection
- Cybersecurity Efforts and Resources
- Information Sharing and Working Groups
 Get Involved



Cyber Critical Infrastructure Protection

• Mandates

- Executive Order 13636: Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.
- Presidential Policy Directive-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.
- Presidential Policy Directive-41: United States Cyber Incident Coordination.
- Executive Order 13800: Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure
- Approach
 - Non-Operational. Education, Facilitation, and
 - Communication.

Put Cybersecurity Risk Management on the Agenda Before it Becomes the Agenda

- No longer sufficient to think about cybersecurity as a purely technical problem.
- Like physical security, the current threat environment requires a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity risk management.
- It is vital to realize the importance of protecting your company's systems from cyber threats.

Surface Division's Cybersecurity Efforts

- Collaboration with industry and government partners to promote cybersecurity risk management resources and programs through awareness and outreach.
- With the goal of:

 Supporting the adoption of the Cybersecurity Framework.

 Increasing an organization's operational resilience and ability to manage cyber risk.

Surface Transportation Cybersecurity Resource Toolkit for Small & Midsize Business (SMB)



Surface Transportation Cybersecurity Resource Toolkit for Small & Midsize Business (SMB)

February 2016	
Security Administration	810* 1-84K CONVEC

 Collection of resources and programs designed to offer guidance on how to incorporate "Cyber Risk" into your organization's existing risk management and governance processes.

No Cost Resources for Surface TSS Industry Stakeholders



Surface Transportation Cybersecurity Resource Toollitt for Small & Midsize Business (SMB) No-Cost Cybersecurity Resource List

Amorican Public Transportation Association Cybarsocurity Considerations for Public Transit: This Recommended Practice establishes considerations for public transit chief information offices (CIOs) interested in developing cybersecurity strategies for their organizations. It details practices and standards that address vulnerability assessment and mitigation, system resiliency and redundancy, and disaster recovery. To download, visit: http://www.apta.com/resources/standards/Documents/APDA%20 SS-ECS-RP-00144 %20 RPp.edd

American Public Transportation Association Securing Control and Communications Systems in Transit Environments:

- Part I: Bomonts, Organization and Risk Assossment / Management: This Recommended Practice
 addresses the importance of control and communications security to a transit agency, provides a
 survey of the various systems that constitute typical transit control and communication systems,
 identifies the steps that an agency would follow to set up a successful program, and establishes the
 stages in conducting a risk assessment and managing risk. To download, visit:
 http://www.apta.com/resources/standards/Documents/APIR-SS-CCS-RP-001-10.pdf
- Part II: Defining a Security Zone Architecture for Rail Transit and Protecting Critical Zones: This Recommended Practice presents Defense-In-Depth as a recommended approach for securing rail communications and control systems, defines security zone classifications, and defines a minimum set of security controls for the most critical zones. To download, visit: http://www.apta.com/resources/standards/Documents/APTR-SS-CCS-RP-002-13.pdf
- Part IIIa: Attack Modeling Security Analysis White Paper: This White Paper covers the APTA attack modeling procedure for transit agencies and their systems integrators and vendors, which may be specified by transit agencies in their procurement documents. To download, visit: http://www.apta.com/resources/standards/Documents/APTA-SS-00-03-15, pdf

Pipelino Socurity Guidelinos: Provides security measures for cyber assets and a list of cybersecurity planning and implementation guidance resources. To download, visit: https://www.tss.gov/stes/default/files/tsapipelinesecurityguidelinese011.pdf

Transportation System Sactor Cyber Working Group (TSSCWG): TSA sponsored public/private joint working group that provides a forum for implementing and fasilitating national policies, programs, modal outreach, awareness, and information sharing. The group meets monthly and also published a weekly newsletter. To be invited, contact Cybersecuity@tsa.dhs.gov

Public Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Conter (ISAC): An electronic, trusted ability to exchange and share information on physical and cyber threats. The center collects, analyzes, and disseminates alerts and incident reports, as well as sectorspecific intelligence products, and helps the government understand sector impacts. To request access to this free service, contact sistac@urldo.etransportationis.ac.org

Stop.Think.Connect. Campaign: National public awareness campaign aimed at increasing the understanding of cyber threats and empowering the American public to be safer and more secure online. Includes customized awareness materials for industry, government, law enforcement, small business, and others. For more information, wisit: http://www.dbs.gov/stoptinink.onnect

Cyborsocurity Framowork (CSF): Riskebased approach to managing cybersecurity risk, allowing framework components to reinforce the connection between business drivers and cybersecurity activities. The framework was developed to complement, not replace, an organization's established risk management process and cybersecurity program. For more information, visit: http://www.nist.gov/cybertramework/ "No-Cost Cybersecurity Resources for Surface Transportation systems" is a factsheet that provides a list of cybersecurity programs and documents that industry can use to reduce their cybersecurity risk and increase their cyber resilience.

Examples include:

- The Critical Infrastructure Cyber
 Community Voluntary Program (C³VP)
- Cyber Risk Management Primer for CEOs/Business Leaders
- Information about the Cyber Resilience Review (CRR) & Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET)


Surface Cybersecurity Awareness Guide

mmmmmm



ansportation ecurity dministration

SURFACE CYBERSECURITY



 Small "pocket-sized" guide outlines the types of threats most commonly found in cyberspace and explains how you can protect your company's data, computer systems, and personal information.

 Serves as a convenient quick reference resource and security awareness tool for employees.




Surface Division Cybersecurity Workshops



- Informs stakeholders about cybersecurity resources, programs and elicit feedback.
- Facilitate discussions of best practices and lessons learned associated with implementing cybersecurity measures.
- Multi-modal participants receive five nontechnical takeaways to consider over the next five days ("5 in 5") to enhance their transportation organizations' cybersecurity posture.

Public Transportation Information Sharing & Analysis Center (PT-ISAC)

- Immediate "all source" incident reporting and threat warning.
- "Push" information vice members having to "Pull" information.
- Unique intelligence sources not normally available:
 - U.S. and foreign governments/International forums
 - National and International Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)
 - Law enforcement entities Independent research



- PT ISAC's Transit and Rail Intelligence Awareness Daily Report (TRIAD)
- Daily Open source Cyber Report

Transportation Systems Sector Cyber Working Group & Weekly Newsletter



Five Things Businesses Should Do ForCyber Security

When I take to EGG across the construction what them what the per them to pathight he willow (one of the top the exposes is related to opter second you constant and no worker. Withink (iv) public bad data brackes (ke Yaioo, Target Linkedh and J. Morgan), comp baloe reqtements, and no worker. Withink (iv) public bad data brackes (ke Yaioo, Target Linkedh and J. Morgan), comp baloe reqtements, and new state-specific bowr requiring expensive do took the stataboots, the is much to address. Will be most the data the too is take been for steed on targer companies, small-and medham steed both leases are the questions at a well. So what can be takes taked are relatively and her the rouge target bours? Although too take to although the stresses to opple recording an usery comp key, the street dy lay go no epis are is battley simple to grasp. Here are the steps bis leases is not take that a strong for is dato in a opper second rule statebay.

ko wi Voir Seisme. Data: The ritstikuiga bishess mistolo bio eqhi a opperseoring program is bio keritoli wiatolati hias. O no eyo iaue keismitka ali be seismite data batmi istte protected agalaistika taatkoito za do ossiyo i eedib bolstoi o wiele fitis boated. How caivo i problectione ali log Yvoi do 'tkiowiwie hitki? These boatboisca be de dexbors, baptos, seuess, mobile deubesaid o to do poulders, biame a ritew. Pittis hi te contextor fallagi hi yo ir lome. Yoi i aue per meter protectorassi a boksaid alami system for the flemsi hi yor riome. However, yoi koo wie he flast batae of ligheraute au may lawa a zare lidde i some wie for da bitba ja poleboolis bite eve to rob brak-h.

Part Stary: http://www.knoxnewis.com/stary/moneybusiness/journal/2016/11/07/5-things-businesses-should-do-cybersecurity/02054294/

Researchers Hijack Public Wi-Fi Connections To Track Cellphones

One moning on the underground bicordon, PlensON han be, a privacy and security researcher at Ox bord his net institute, notice dome this strange abort is prione: Rikept and matically connecting to WI-Finetworks from its provider with or transferring or a practice stranding or an at bott be.

What started off as a notiser moning on the the prompted Off as hor's text research protect. He began digging in botte whick year labole proble, attornation HFT provided by the priore companies, and booking at the ways floor is be exprised and spled on, it trus ort, those consections, with it angle tappes with otconsent, are insecte and tree complet and can be easily its broughed by mail block tacket or of bus enforcement.

What O'Hanko hand it Oxnord research associate, Raukiankar Borgao akar, ko ked into was a peuto ksiy known bit in addressed faor in the arb math WFF I problock that work failow someone to track the location of piones that connect to these networks. White hole specific are available or the faw, if is ode piyole sgralled in the system that two vid require a targe ouerhan to fix some to be group an kes are vite ager to invest in.

Full Stry: https://the.inderce.ptcom/2010/11/07/harckers-and-law-enforcement-t-could-hillarck-wilk-connections-b-trackcelphones/

- Joint Working Group
- Monthly Meetings
- Implementing National Policies
- Modal Outreach Awareness and Coordination
- Information Sharing Best Practices
- Facilitating Government Programs and Efforts
- Weekly Newsletter

APTA Recommended Practice Cybersecurity Working Groups

- Control and Communications Security
 - Securing Control and Communications
 Systems in Transit Environments Part 1
 - Securing Control and Communications Systems in Rail Transit Environments Part 2
 - Securing Control and Communications Systems in Rail Transit Environments, Part 3a
 - Securing Control and Communications Systems in Rail Transit Environments Part 3b
- Enterprise

Cybersecurity Considerations for Public Transit



Securing Control and Communications Systems in Rail Transit Environments

Part II: Defining a Security Zone Architecture for Rail Transit and Protecting Critical Zones

Abstract: This document covers recommended practices for securing control and communication systems in rail transit environments.

Keywords: communications based-train control (CBTC), control and communications security, cybersecurity, positive train control (PTC), radio, rail transit vehicle, SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition), train control, signalling

Summary: This Recommended Fractice is Part-II in a series of documents to be released. Part-I released in July 2010 addresses the importance of control and communications security to a transit agency, provides a survey of the various systems that constitute typical transit control and communication systems, identifies the steps that an agency would low to set up a successful program, and establishes the stages in conducting a rick assessment and managing risk. Part-II present. Definese-In-Depth as a recommended approach for security controls for the most critical zones, the SAFE-TY CRITICAL SECURITY ZONE (SCS2) and the FB2, LBF-SAFETY SECURITY ZONE (FLS2). Later parts will cover recommended practices for less critical zones, the rail valuelos, and provide other publicse for a transit agency.

Scope and purpose: This Recommended Practice is not intended to supplant existing safety or security standards or regulations. It is instead intended to supplement and provide additional guidance. Passenger transit agencies and the vender community now evolve their security reguiments and system security features independently for most of the systems listed above. The purpose of this Recommended Practice is to share transit agencies that a minimum requirement for control security within the transit inductive, provide a guide of common security requirements to control and operations systems vendors, adopt voluntary industry practices in control security madvance and in coordination with government regulation; and raise awareness of control security concerns and issues in the industry.

This Recommended Practice represents a common viewpoint of those parties concerned with its provisions, namely, transit operating/planning agencies, manufactures, consultants, engineers and general interest groups. The application of any standards, practices or guidelines contained herein is voluntary. In some cases, Medral and/or state regulations government regulations and the cases, the government regulations take precedence over this standard. APTA recognizes that for certain applications, the standards or practices, as implemented by Individual transit agencies, may be either more or less restrictive than those given in this document.

© 2013 American Public Transportation Association. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, in an electronic retrieval system or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the American Public Transportation Association.

TSA Surface Cybersecurity Resources

- For additional information and/or to request the Awareness Guide or Toolkit, email: Lee.Allen@tsa.dhs.gov
- For additional information about joining the Transportation Systems Sector Cyber Working Group or to receive *This Week in Transportation Cybersecurity*, email: <u>Cybersecurity@tsa.dhs.gov</u>