determines it is in the public interest to do so based on the assessment and to submit a report to Congress "on the findings of the assessment . . . and on any actions to revise or replace the call authentication frameworks."

Pursuant to this Congressional mandate, we seek comment to inform our analysis of the efficacy of the STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication framework that the Commission required voice service providers to implement on their IP networks. (We do not, in this Public Notification, seek comment on caller ID authentication in non-IP networks. In the September 2020 Second Caller ID Authentication Report and Order, the Commission determined that no standardized framework for non-IP networks existed and consequently required providers to work to develop a solution rather than implement a framework. The Commission recently sought comment on whether we should require providers to implement a non-IP caller ID authentication solution. Because the Commission has not yet mandated providers to implement any particular non-IP caller ID authentication technology, there is no implemented technology to assess in this required reevaluation.) We start by seeking comment on the standard by which we should assess the efficacy of STIR/SHAKEN. We propose to assess the efficacy of STIR/SHAKEN based on how well it effectuates the authentication of caller ID information. We believe this is the best standard because it evaluates the effectiveness of the STIR/SHAKEN framework at executing the function of the technology mandated under section 4: performing caller ID authentication. We seek comment on this proposal. Is there another way to interpret this statutory language and assess the STIR/SHAKEN framework? For example, should we measure the impact of STIR/SHAKEN on preventing illegally spoofed robocalls, or preventing all illegal robocalls, to determine its efficacy? How would such an approach be consistent with the text of the statute? Would it be an appropriate measure of STIR/SHAKEN’s effectiveness as a caller ID authentication framework? Or would such an approach only measure the impact and limitations of caller ID authentication generally, regardless of “the technologies used”? Could different caller ID authentication frameworks more or less effectively combat illegally spoofed or all illegal robocalls?

We next seek comment on the efficacy of the STIR/SHAKEN framework under this standard. Has STIR/SHAKEN proven to effectively authenticate caller ID information? Are there ways it could be more effective at that task and, if so, how? Do any specific factors limit its efficacy, and what solutions might resolve those issues? Will any identified concerns be addressed by further deployment across the voice network? In the Bureau’s December 2020 Report to Congress, we stated that, without widespread implementation, it was “premature to assess the efficacy of STIR/SHAKEN in practice” at that time. (The TRACED Act required the Commission to submit that report “not later than 12 months after” enactment.) Since that date, many voice service providers have been required to implement, and have implemented, STIR/SHAKEN. Is it still premature to evaluate the efficacy of STIR/SHAKEN in practice? If so, we seek comment on whether commenters continue to believe that the framework is effective as designed. And if commenters believe we should evaluate STIR/SHAKEN under a different or additional standard, we seek comment on the efficacy of STIR/SHAKEN under any alternative standards proposed. Under any standard, we seek comment on whether the efficacy of STIR/SHAKEN would improve when the framework is paired with other tools or if there are additional steps that the Bureau, Commission, or stakeholders such as voice service providers or the Governance Authority could take to improve the efficacy of STIR/SHAKEN.

(Recognizing the benefits of pairing caller ID authentication with call analytics, the Commission adopted a safe harbor enabling voice service providers to block unwanted calls by default based on reasonable analytics that incorporate caller ID authentication information, so long as consumers are given the opportunity to opt out.) Should the Commission consider whether it is in the public interest to revise or replace the STIR/SHAKEN framework? Would revising or replacing the framework at this time be premature, as providers continue to take steps to implement the technology consistent with the Commission’s efforts to bolster its caller ID authentication rule scheme? How would the costs of such revision or replacement compare to the benefits? We ask that any comments indicating that the STIR/SHAKEN framework is ineffective at authenticating caller ID information identify alternatives that would more effectively authenticate caller ID information.
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The telephone number is 202–366–9329.

Instructions: To ensure proper docketing of your comment, please include the agency name and docket number DOT–OST–2022–0051 or the Regulatory Identification Number (RIN), 2105–AE98 for the rulemaking at the beginning of your comments. All comments received will be posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information provided.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Marc D. Pentino, Departmental Office of Civil Rights, Office of the Secretary, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590; telephone number 202–366–6968; marc.pentino@dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On July 21, 2022, at 87 FR 43620, DOT published in the Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking proposing to amend its Disadvantaged Business Enterprise and Airport Concession Disadvantaged Business Enterprise regulations at 49 CFR part 26 and part 23. The proposal includes other provisions to update and strengthen the Department’s regulation, and to modernize the program’s eligibility and procedural requirements. In addition, the rulemaking proposed technical corrections that have led to substantive misinterpretations of the rules by recipients, program applicants and participants.

The original comment period for the proposal would have closed September 19, 2022. However, DOT stakeholders have expressed concern that this closing date does not provide sufficient time to coordinate with their respective members and working groups to develop comments to the NPRM and/or to submit comments to the docket, particularly on provisions they view are of a complex nature and impact operations.

The Department has carefully considered the requests to extend the comment period on the NPRM and agrees that given the length and breadth of topics covered, a period beyond the 60-day comment period is warranted. The Department finds that there is a strong interest in timely issuance of this priority rulemaking but is interested in providing the public with additional time to comment.

To allow time for interested parties to submit comments, the closing date is changed from September 19, 2022, to October 31, 2022. All members of the public, including DOT recipients and sponsors, prime contractors, small businesses, trade organizations, and consultants are invited to submit comments.

Signed in Washington, DC, on or around August 26, 2022 under authority delegated in 49 CFR 1.27(a):

John Putnam, General Counsel.

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